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Abstract:
This paper examines the criticisms China has received over its involvement in Africa over the past
decade.  By  utilising  case  studies  of  two  sub-Saharan  African  countries,  empirical  data,  and
economic development theory it seeks to investigate and answer those criticisms. The criticisms
revolve around three aspects; human rights, poverty, and the environment. This paper will argue
that on the first two the criticisms are mostly unjustified, however, on the issue of environmental
concerns, Chinese involvement in Africa raises serious concerns. Finally, the paper will argue that
traditional development aid is in need of reconfiguration to achieve its desired outcomes, and that
the binary world view on aid and involvement in Africa must be reconsidered. 
Keywords: China, Africa, development, aid, economic colonialism, aid organizations, criticism of Chinese foreign 
policy, economic development theory, sustainable development.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Chinese Foreign Aid
After six decades of communist rule, three decades of reform and economic growth, China has
transformed from an underdeveloped and war-torn country to the second largest economy in the
world. Continued development in this direction at this pace will undoubtedly transform China into a
fully  fledged  superpower.  With  the  recently  launched  Liaoning  aircraft  carrier,  one  can  see
indications of Chinese military development heading in the direction of modernization and force
projection. 
However, until recently China has been relatively closed-off and inward-looking. Perhaps as a result
of a century of being taken advantage of, perhaps as a result of the revolution, perhaps due to the
realities of the cold war, and perhaps due to the pressing needs of the domestic issues. Particularly,
there are two compounding factors that seem instrumental in China’s nascent global outlook; the
globalizing trend in the world as a whole, and the transformation of the Chinese economy, first into
a major exporter and with an increasing consumer base also a major importer. 
Now, and for some time, China is rising. It has reached the point where there exists a discussion on
whether it is a developing or developed country. It has the world’s second largest economy, it is the
world’s  largest  exporter,  and  is  the  world’s  largest  emitter  of  climate  gases.  The  exceptional
sustained growth has also led to the Chinese economy outpacing China’s resources, and for it to
meet its growing energy demands, foreign supply must increase. There are many discussions and
debates around these issues, but combined they entail the necessity of an active Chinese foreign
policy to satisfy Chinese interests. 
These challenges, though, are not exclusive to China. It is not the only the only major power that
has grown beyond its borders. The US and Europe, in particular, are major actors outside of their
own domains, even towards China. Along with Japan, the EU and the US are China’s main trade
partners, and all have large, influential and deep-reaching economies. Consider, for instance, how
the European economic recession impacts China with lessened demand for Chinese exports. 
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With its rapid economic growth and newfound position on the global economic stage, China has
been increasing economic cooperation with many countries. 
However, China's increased economic activity in Africa and willingness to engage in trade with
authoritarian regimes without pressure for human rights reform has drawn criticism from Western
governments, academics, and aid organizations. 
This  thesis  seeks to  investigate  the correlation between Chinese economic involvement  in sub-
Saharan African countries and development of human rights and living conditions. 
1.2 Thesis Question
In order to do this, some parameters must be defined. The first thing one must clarify is from which 
position are the critics of China's involvement in Africa approaching the position. That is, what is 
their desired outcomes for the African countries in question? After answering this question, one 
must begin with first establishing what "Chinese involvement in Africa" actually is, and then, 
finally, one can look at how China's involvement in Africa affects these desired outcomes. 
Preliminary, one begins with the issue of who the critics are. Primarily, they are Western non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) mainly vested in emergency- and development aid. 
Organizations such as Doctors Without Borders, Norwegian Church Aid, and so forth. However, 
criticism towards Chinese involvement in Africa often also originates from Western media and 
academics. 
The desired outcomes of African development for these critics will be further elaborated upon in 
chapter 2, but for now it can be briefly summed up as three main aspects: political development, 
economic development, and environmental concerns. For the first aspect, this centers around 
democratization; Western critics of China argue that Chinese involvement in Africa helps sustain 
authoritarian regimes and hinders democratization of the countries in question. For the second 
aspect, criticism revolves around "new colonialism" with China being the foreign power pillaging 
African states for their natural resources so that their wealth do not benefit their citizens. And, 
finally, the third aspect, environmental concerns, is with regards to how rapid industrialization and 
use of non-renewable resources affects both the global climate as well as local environments. 
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Upon further examination of these claims, one must first, as previously mentioned, determine the 
level of Chinese involvement in Africa, for the purposes of its scope in and of itself, but also 
relative to the scope of Western corporate involvement. The former to determine if the level of 
Chinese involvement is as large as claimed, and the latter to determine if it actually is China who is 
the big player on the continent, rather than the West. 
With these issues in mind, the thesis question becomes: "Is Chinese economic involvement harmful 
or beneficial to sub-Saharan African countries?"
1.3 Finding the Answer
In order to provide a context for this question, a range of theories must be discussed. First and
foremost, the criticisms leveled at China must be elaborated and formed into observable statements.
Secondly, academic texts regarding what exactly China's involvement consists of must be brought
in to ensure the validity of the thesis question itself, and contrasted with the criticisms. Thirdly,
development theory must be taken into account as a theoretic base for what China's activities are
expected to entail. 
After the theory section, the methods used to find answers to the thesis question will be explained.
In this paper, several data sources will be utilized to construct case studies of two countries with a
large degree of Chinese involvement; Angola and Zambia. This data will show development in the
countries in question, and data on Chinese (and other countries') level  of involvement. 
In addition to the case studies, theoretical arguments will be brought forth to examine the reliability
of the criticisms against Chinese involvement. 
1.4 Terms and Definitions.
Immediately, an issue that springs up is the nature of Chinese involvement in Africa, Western 
involvement, emergency aid, development aid, trade, and commerce. In this paper, the term 
"Chinese involvement in Africa" will be using a wide-ranging definition of all aspects of Chinese 
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involvement on the continent that is at least to some extent connected to the central government in 
Beijing, including commercial enterprises by companies in which the Chinese government is an 
active shareholder, and more independent Chinese companies receiving financing from China 
Eximbank. The main reason for this wide-ranging definition is that the main criticisms of Chinese 
involvement conflate different kinds of involvement by any Chinese source as part of an 
overarching hierarchical structure. 
1.4.1 What is aid and development?
Aid is a concept that can be difficult to operationalize. Were one to ask the proverbial man in the 
street, he might point to emergency aid, in the form of basic foodstuffs, water, and healthcare, or 
development loans, or particular projects, such as vaccination projects by the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation. In other words; gifts and concessions. Or, on the other hand, one could see increased 
aid, through either free trade agreements with beneficial terms for the “recipient country” or other 
incentives from the governments in “donor countries” for their companies to trade with developing 
countries. The latter is interesting in light of the question at hand, since an increase in bilateral trade
is the method preferred by China in its development work abroad (Zhao, 2010: 424-430) and it is 
precisely this China is criticized for as being advantageous to them over their African partners 
(Hawkins, 2013). 
On this basis it is thus important to use a wide understanding and definition on what is seen as aid 
in the context of the thesis question. For this reason, this paper will define the term aid as both 
consisting of emergency aid (such as handing out foodstuffs, mosquito nets, and drinking water) 
and all forms of economic trade outside the free market (that is, examples such as loans to countries
which otherwise might not be able to obtain such loans, loans with interest rates below market rates,
resource-backed credit, bilateral trade agreements, etc), as well as an increase in trade within the 
free market (for instance, Chinese companies competing for profitable projects). 
Development is another term that may have a debatable meaning. Historically development has 
often been operationalized as growth in gross domestic product (GDP), or growth in GDP per 
capita. There are, however, certain problems with using GDP-growth as a measure of development. 
Kenneth Pomeranz (2012: 137) argues that the development must first and foremost be sustainable. 
If, for instance, a developing country basing its national economy on oil exports experiences a time 
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of increasing oil prices, it will appear as a great growth of its GDP, however, this would not be 
sustainable without a diversification of the country's economy should the oil prices return to a lower
level. An example that will come up in this paper is Angola, which experienced high levels of GDP 
growth in the last decade, however, as will be seen in the article by Erica Downs (2007) later, a 
great deal of this must be attributed to increasing oil prices. 
Furthermore, Pomeranz points to that even though the U.S. and Europe had great, and lasting, 
economic growth in the post-war period, few would call this development. A better way, thus, to 
measure development is by using the Human Development Index (HDI). This index provides a 
better way in which to measure development as it shows tangible improvements in the life standards
of the population and better represents a country's ability to withstand and handle external economic
events, such as decreasing oil prices (or increasing oil prices for non-producing countries). 
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Chapter 2: Theory
2.1 History of Sino-African Relations and the "Beijing Consensus."
When  looking  at  the  history  of  Sino-African  relations  from the  establishment  of  the  People’s
Republic until present time, there are two significant events that can be seen as paradigm shifts. The
first is the People’s Republic taking over the China seat in the United Nations Security Council in
1971, and the second is the end of the cold war with the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The first form of Chinese involvement in Africa after the establishment of the People’s Republic
was the traditional type of socialist foreign aid, as a part of the revolutionary Third World strategy
for  reaching out  to  like-minded regimes  (Dittmer,  2010).  This  included agricultural  machinery,
infrastructure development, medical teams, and political support to friendly regimes (Brautigam,
2007). An example of this is the railway between Zambia and Tanzania, built and operated by the
Chinese, a model of Chinese developmental aid that has continued to this day (Brautigam, 2011).
This  also  developed  into  a  deeper  focus  on  another  aspect,  which  was  the  competition  for
legitimacy as “the true China” versus the regime in Taipei. Beijing needed states to recognize it,
rather than Taipei, as the legitimate China.  Dubbed dollar diplomacy, this consisted of increased aid
and support in exchange for recognition in the UN (Gill and Reilly, 2007). To a great extent this
ended with Beijing’s ascendancy to the United Nations Security Council permanent seat in 1971,
and today only five African nations still  recognize the Taipei regime as the legitimate rulers of
China (ibid.). 
The third aspect was the global political climate of the Cold war, with China being among the non-
aligned countries, or the so-called third world. As an aside, it bears mentioning that for the purposes
of this paper we shall use the Western definition of the three worlds, where the first world is the
United States and allies, the second world is the USSR and allies, and the third world is the non-
aligned  countries.  Though  a  great  portion  of  the  world  was  entangled  in  the  cold  war  with
allegiances on the capitalist or soviet-communist side, another great portion found itself unaligned,
or unwilling to align. With Mao at the helm, China adopted the policy of ‘leaning to one side’
(Saich, 2011), but with a deteriorating relationship between Moscow and Beijing after the death of
Stalin and the subsequent Soviet criticism of Stalinism, China found itself in a state of somewhat
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international isolation, especially with the lack of international recognition of the Beijing regime. 
However, China was not the only country that did not find itself a comfortable fit in either the
Soviet  or  American  spheres  of  influence.  An  increasing  cooperation  between  the  non-aligned
countries began at the Bandung conference in 1955, where China was represented by Zhou Enlai. 
This aspect can be seen to be continued today, after the fall of the Soviet Union, albeit in a different
form.  While  Beijing  espouses  bilateral  relations  as  desirable,  a  new  polarity  appears  to  be
manifesting itself in the world: no longer between the capitalist west and the socialist east, but now
between the rich north and the poor south. Or, in other words, developed countries on the one hand,
and developing countries  on the other.  Within this  context,  the Beijing Consensus can act as a
counterweight  to  the  Washington  Consensus.  The  Beijing  Consensus  focuses  on  bilateral
agreements  over  multilateralism  and  the  Chinese  model  of  development  where  state-directed
economic growth supersedes democratization (Barr, 2011). Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong
(2008) argue  that  the Beijing Consensus  can be a  great  source  for  soft  power  for  China,  with
sustainable  economic  development  and  self-determination  for  states  as  its  main  selling  points.
However, it is important to note that the term Beijing Consensus has been criticized for just being a
catch-all phrase referring to everything related to China’s rise and that there really is no consensus
at all, merely pragmatic realpolitik (Suzuki, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the Beijing Consensus can still be a useful tool for approaching the question of how
Beijing  views  foreign  policy.  Particularly  its  focus  on  bilateral  relations  can  indicate  an
unwillingness to  compete directly with the current  major  power constellations in  the world,  as
despite an adverse economic climate, world power is still concentrated around the North Atlantic,
both militarily and economically. For instance, in the post-Soviet world, the only remaining blue
water navies, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, are all NATO members, and the
European Union is  the  world’s  largest  economy,  with  the US being the  world’s  largest  single-
country economy. And with a potential EU-USA free trade agreement, China might be wary of an
increased  concentration  of  power  around  the  North  Atlantic,  greatly  mitigating  the  increased
influence of Beijing. 
Today, there are clear indications of an increased interest from the Chinese side for a greater degree
of involvement in Africa. Gill and Reilly (2007) argue that “Beijing seems to sense that Africa is on
the verge of an economic and political renaissance.” This argument has also been strengthened with
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an increasing frequency of state visits to African nations by the new Chinese leadership. 
2.2 Criticisms levelled against Chinese involvement in Africa
Among  those  who  have  levelled  criticism against  China's  involvement  in  Africa,  Western  aid
organizations  stand  at  the  forefront.  Secretary  General  of  Norwegian  Church  Aid,  Atle
Sommerfeldt,  for  instance,  stated,  in  conjunction  with  the  2010 Nobel  Peace  Prize  to  Chinese
dissident Liu Xiaobo, that he saw the Prize as a potential positive correction to China's influence in
African nations (Kirkens Nødhjelp, 2010). He continues to state that it is "China's methods, tied to
ethics,  social  standards,  and companies'  social  responsibility that  must  be challenged" and that
additionally  "[Chinese  companies]  do  not  have  the  same  environmental  standards  as  Western
actors."
Sommerfeldt  acknowledges  the  economic  growth  resulting  from the  Chinese  involvement  and
praises it as positive (Kirkens Nødhjelp, 2010), so his criticism is limited to concerns with regards
to human rights and democratization. 
Chinese  involvement  in  Africa  has  also  frequently been criticized  in  and by the  media.  These
criticisms range from the more measured, such as the ones by Norwegian Church Aid, to the more
comprehensive  including  other  aspects  affected  by  Chinese  money  and  investment.  One  such
comprehensive critical piece can be found in the British newspaper The Telegraph, by author David
Blair, entitled "Why China is trying to colonise Africa" (Blair, 2007). 
In his article, Blair begins by juxtaposing the 19th century "scramble for Africa" by Western powers
and the current Chinese entry to Africa, criticising the lack of attention paid to China's activities
compared to 19th century imperialism; "No one alive could at the close of the 19 th century could
have missed "the scramble for Africa" (...) where [the European powers] carved up the continent.
(...) Today, few appear to have noticed that a second "scramble for Africa" is under way. This time,
only one giant country is involved, but its ambitions are every bit as momentous as those of Rhodes
and company" (Blair, 2007). The country he is referring to, of course, is China. 
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Blair argues that reliable information on the scope of Chinese involvement is difficult to obtain,
however “we do know that trade between China and the world's poorest continent totalled about
£30 billion [in 2006] – a sixfold increase since 2000” (Blair, 2007). In addition to acquiring one
third of its oil in Africa, Blair points to “Beijing acquiring mines in Zambia, textile factories in
Lesotho, railways in Uganda, timber in the Central African Republic and retail developments in
almost every capital” (ibid.). He continues to argue that the reason for China's scramble for Africa is
a result of the combination of its own diminishing resources and its growing demand for more, and
that the West have already acquired the majority of contracts on the majority of the world's oil
supplies in the Middle East. 
The result of this, argues Blair, is financial support to unsavoury regimes which allows them to
carry out atrocities: 
“Thanks to Beijing's interest in Sudan's oil, President Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum
has received a windfall.  Ten years ago, Sudan's oil  revenues were negligible;  last year,  
Chinese investment ensured that they totalled at least £3 billion. Without this ready cash, Mr
Bashir could never have sustained the war in Darfur, where four years of fighting have 
claimed  about  300,000  lives,  either  from violence,  starvation  or  disease.  The  military  
machine that has laid waste to vast tracts of land, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee their
homes, was, in effect, bankrolled by Beijing. Moreover, China has sold weapons directly to 
Sudan, notably Fantan ground attack aircraft."
(Blair, 2007). 
In addition to Sudan, Blair brings up Zimbabwe where he claims Chinese financial support has
provided Robert Mugabe, otherwise a pariah in the international community, with the resources to
strengthen his party, Zanu-PF. China, Blair argues, has become the ally of choice for the worst
regimes  in  Africa.  To underscore  his  argument,  he  points  to  the  2006 presidential  elections  in
Zambia  where  he  claims  the  opposition  leader  ran  on  an  anti-China  ticket,  and  even  though
eventually  losing  the  election,  gained  tremendous  support  in  the  areas  affected  by  Chinese
investments (Blair, 2007). 
Finally, Blair claims that the influx of Chinese goods and products on the African market have not
assisted the economy, rather he claims Zimbabweans refer to them condescendingly as "zing zong"
products, which has a tendency to break apart in one's hands, and that the employment opportunities
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provided by Chinese copper mines in Zambia are based on exploitation of local labour with a
disregard for basic health and safety standards, while simultaneously driving local companies out of
business by flooding the market in cheap Chinese imports.
To sum up Blair's article, he claims that China financially supports and enables atrocities carried out
by their  allied  African  regimes,  destroys  local  economies  by flooding  the  markets  with  cheap
imported Chinese products, and exploits the local labour force to fuel its own growing economy at
home. 
Scott Zhou, a Shanghai-based analyst on China's politics, economy and international relations, is
the author of another article in which criticism of Chinese involvement in Africa comes to the fore.
Entitled “China as Africa's 'angel in white'” it was published in Asian Times in 2006 and revolves
around the Chinese response to some of the criticism regarding China's actions in Africa, as well as
adding some criticism of its own. 
The article begins by reporting that as a result of increasing criticism on its “neo-colonialist conduct
in Africa” Chinese authorities have issued a code of conduct for Chinese workers and investors on
the continent (Zhou, 2006). Zhou continues by drawing a line from the Maoist era when China sent
doctors and nurses, so-called 'white angels,' to Africa to the current era of businessmen and workers.
The heavy criticism, particularly from Western sources,  this has incurred,  argues Zhou, has led
China to readjust its approach to Africa as Beijing is growing weary that such criticism may sow
discord and sour business relations. A manifestation of this readjustment is the code of conduct,
which requires Chinese companies to abide by local laws, bid on contracts in a transparent manner,
protect labour rights of employees, protect the environment, etc. (Zhou, 2006).  
Zhou (2006) argues that China's investments in Africa have paid off handsomely, mentioning that
30 percent of China's crude oil imports originate from Africa, and that this trade relationship is
turning towards a balance heavily favouring China, which receives raw materials in exchange for
manufactured goods. The scope of this, Zhou claims, will pass $50 billion in the year of his article.
He continues to state that this relationship will ensure that the African countries, as a result of it,
will remain weak economies. 
Concluding his article, Zhou (2006), argues that despite China wanting to use the former colonial
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excesses  of  Western  powers  in  Africa  to  establish  a  moral  high  ground,  as  well  as  a  business
advantage with countries in which these memories and repercussions still shape current realities,
China might indeed be the colonial power of the current era. 
Another source of media coverage of Chinese involvement in Africa can be found in the British
newspaper The Guardian.  On its  websites it  features a running article series entitled "China in
Africa: soft power, hard cash." Among the articles featured in the editor's pick section, the article
entitled "China commits billions in aid to Africa as part of charm offensive" (Provost and Harris,
2013) appears. 
The article is for the most part rather positive and optimistically minded of Chinese investments in
Africa, and revolves around newly published research from AidData at the College of William and
Mary that shows that a large part of Chinese financial investments in Africa have been towards
health,  education  and cultural  projects.  As examples,  the  article  mentions  installations  of  solar
traffic lights and funding of a malaria prevention centre in Liberia, as well as a National School for
Visual  Arts  in  Mozambique  (Provost  and Harris,  2013).  Quoting  Vijaya  Ramachandran,  senior
fellow at the Washington-based think-tank Centre for Global Development, it states: “The dominant
narrative has been one of China's insatiable desire for resources. But in fact [this data] suggests
there may be many more things going on” (Provost and Harris, 2013). 
However, the article also points out that of about 1,700 projects in the data, only about 1,000 have
been carried out, or are under way; the rest have simply failed to materialize (Provost and Harris,
2013). In addition, a great deal of the programmes, argue the authors, can be linked to the Chinese
trade  agenda.  One  mentioned  was  that  while  Chinese  doctors  have  been  operating  in  African
countries, recently their objectives were expanded to include promoting Chinese pharmaceuticals
(Provost and Harris, 2013. Another programme, of training journalists in Angola and Zimbabwe,
was criticized for being inconsistent in the relation between what the programme purported to teach
the journalists and what the realities of journalism in China was (Provost and Harris, 2013). 
However, it should also be noted that among the articles in this series, there are also some that are
predominantly positive  in  their  outlook  on Chinese  involvement.  On such is  entitled  “Chinese
hospitals heals sore spot in Zambia” and is written by David Smith (2013). The article takes the
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form of a human interest story, detailing the change in circumstances for both a young local mother
who now has access to health care, and for the Chinese staff of the hospital. 
In the article, Smith (2013) highlights the positives of Chinese investments and aid work in Africa,
however, this is also linked with Chinese business aspirations on the continent:
“Greg Mills, director of the Johannesburg-based thinktank the Brenthurst Foundation, said:
"Essentially, the Chinese will realise, like others before them, that good governance norms 
are not luxuries but necessities in protecting investments and relationships from the vagaries
of leadership and paucity of institutions, in Africa as elsewhere.
"Similarly, soft  power is an important tool in reducing sensitivities to a fear of outside  
domination,  whether by the west or Chinese for that matter,  especially important given  
Africa's  colonial  history and the  pernicious  prevalence  of  a  zero-sum mentality  among  
Africans when it comes to investment and operations in Africa by outsiders – a fear of  
outsiders taking what rightfully belongs to them."”
(Smith, 2013)
These concluding paragraphs put the Chinese hospital in a context of a desire from Beijing to build
soft  power  and improve business  relations  by bringing  positive  change to  partner  countries  in
Africa. While these paragraphs, along with earlier sections of the article, appear regretful over the
cynicism by which results have been achieved, the article nevertheless expresses the view that on
the whole this is a positive development for Zambia. 
In addition to the media and aid organizations, there have also been academics criticizing China
with regards to its involvement in Africa. One of those is anthropologist Jane Goodall. Primarily,
her criticisms concerns environmental degradation, but in an interview with Agence Presse-France,
she expanded here criticisms by stating that "In Africa, China is merely doing what the colonialists
did. They want raw materials for their economic growth, just as the colonialists were going into
Africa  and taking the  natural  resources,  leaving people  poorer"  (Rawstory,  2014).  In  the  same
interview she describes Chinese involvement in Africa as a "disaster." As stated, her concerns are
primarily with regards to the environment, however, as the above quote exemplifies, she argues that
the Chinese involvement in Africa makes Africans poorer. 
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Goodall's concerns and criticisms rest on two factors. The first being the environmental damage
done by Chinese industry in Africa, focusing on short-term financial gains while simultaneously
destroying local ecosystems, polluting locally as well as globally, and shifting too many economies
too quickly towards an unsustainable, environmentally, economic model. Secondly, she argues that
what China is doing in Africa is economic exploitation, chaining Africans to being the bottom rung
countries, stuck in a subservient trade relationship with a more powerful country, which reaps all
the benefits by building up its own manufacturing industry and receiving needed raw materials to
fuel it. 
To briefly sum up, these criticisms revolve around three main aspects; democracy, environment, and
poverty.  The critics  of  Chinese  involvement  in  Africa  claim that  it  hinders  democratization  of
African authoritarian regimes by sustaining the regimes in question by providing access financial
assets and by obstructing international response in forums such as the UN. 
The  criticism on  environment  revolves  around  the  lack  of  sustainability  and  accountability  of
businesses  in  the  rapid  industrialization  of  poor  countries  and  plundering  of  non-renewable
resources. 
And finally, with regards to poverty, China is accused of exploiting poor countries and trapping
them in an economic relationship where China retains the upper hand and the higher gains, while
destroying  the  local  economy,  both  by out-competing  local  small  businesses  and  by hindering
diversification of economies. 
17
2.3 “The Dragon's Gift.”
Deborah Brautigam, a professor of comparative politics at Johns Hopkins University and expert on
Sino-African studies, is the author of "The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa." As a
researcher of contemporary politics, Deborah Brautigam goes beyond reading existing studies and
hopes to base her research on her own experiences. Since the 1980s, she has spent a great amount of
time  living  in  China  and  several  African  countries,  visiting  and  interviewing  companies,
government officials, scholars, and local workers and residents. 
In this book, relying on “nearly three decades of scholarship” and “field research in South Africa,
Nigeria,  Tanzania,  Zambia,  Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Sierra  Leone,  and  Zimbabwe,  as  well  as
interviews  in  Washington,  Beijing,  and  Europe”  (Brautigam,  2009:  vii),  Deborah  Brautigam
presents“the real story of China in Africa” from a historical perspective.
The first  two chapters  review the history of  the  China-Africa relationship.  In  the first  chapter,
Brautigam introduces Chinese foreign aid before and during Mao era and compares it with the aid
from the west. While the latter is usually known to have origins “in the missionary outposts of the
Victorian age and the development and welfare funds set up in the last decades of the colonial
period” (Brautigam, 2009: 22), the content of Chinese aid and the way their aid is delivered differ
from the West (Brautigam, 2009: 24). 
The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” introduced by China’s former premier Zhou Enlai in
1954, have been and are still used today as the bedrock of China’s foreign police and aid strategy:
according to Brautigam, “Equality and mutual benefit” are reflected in Chinese leaders’ frequent
insistence that aid is a partnership, not a one-way transfer of charity (Brautigam, 2009: 30). During
the Maoist time, despite the continuous political clashes, China was still able to establish its first
round of aid programs across thirty African countries and even “gave more aid than the USSR”
(Brautigam, 2009: 34). 
Chapter  2  moves on to  discuss  the  effect  of  China’s  economic  and social  transition on its  aid
policies since Deng Xiaoping took power. In 1982, the current Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited
eleven African countries in a four-week trip, which marks the announcement of henceforth four sets
of  principles  of  the  new China’s  relationship  with  other  developing  countries  — equality  and
mutual benefit;  stress on practical results;  diversity in form; and common progress (Brautigam,
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2009: 53). 
Back in Beijing, Zhao and Chinese aid officials, by “feeling the stones”, introduced three reform
focuses for aid: the structure of the aid system, the standard operating procedures for aid, and the
African local human resources (Brautigam, 2009: 55). These reforms set the base for the speeding
up of future Sino-African cooperation. Another point Brautigam argues is that Chinese leaders, in
the early stage of their relationship with the African countries, had already strategically linked aid to
investment. Either leasing the aid projects, or setting up joint ventures — China had been sticking
to its “mutual benefit” principle from the beginning. 
Chapter 3’s title, “Going Global: Foreign Aid in the Toolkit of a Rising China,” reveals that China’s
foreign  aid  has  played  an  important  role  in  helping  Chinese  enterprises  in  “going  global.”
Brautigam  briefly  summarizes  China’s  overseas  endeavours  since  the  introduction  of  Deng
Xiaoping’s "Open Door" policies from the 1970s and into the new millennium. While many foreign
investments were “brought in” to China, more and more Chinese companies were encouraged to
“go out,”  to find new markets, establish brand names, and invest overseas (Brautigam, 2009: 74). 
In this socio-historical background, Brautigam argues that, “characteristically, the Chinese embrace
of  globalization,  and  the  role  aid  would  play  in  that  embrace,  would  not  look  much  like
globalization viewed from the West” and that “Beijing’s engagement with Africa involved a well-
thought-out  and  long-term  strategy,  not  the  hasty,  desperate  scramble  familiar  from  media
headlines” (ibid). She describes the three steps Chinese government took in addressing the political
and economic challenges from within and outside of the nation: 
"First,  a  major  aid  reform  in  1995  created  new  instruments  to  link  aid,  trade,  and
investment together.  Second, after 2000, Chinese leaders took on a much higher profile
stance as promoters of “common prosperity,” creating regional organizations to support a
series of programs that combined aid and economic cooperation. Third, parallel to joining
the  World  Trade Organization,  Beijing  refined  its  portfolio  of  tools  to  aid  its  domestic
restructuring  by  pushing  its  mature  “sunset”  industries  offshore.  A  quiet  decision  to
establish up to fifty special economic cooperation zones in other countries would become
the most visible signal of this step."
(Brautigam, 2009: 78)
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Brautigam also emphasizes that the mandate from China’s State Council Ministry of Commerce is
to “combine aid to Africa, mutual cooperation, and trade together” (Brautigam, 2009: 80). Later in
the chapter, she writes about how the Chinese government helps Chinese enterprises to invest in
Africa (e.g., providing lower-cost loans to companies, launching China-Africa Development Fund
to  support  investment,  setting  up  overseas  zones  to  reduce  risks  and  uncertainty,  etc.)  In
comparison, many US and European manufacturers have “shied away from investing in African
factories” and official support lacks in these countries (Brautigam, 2009: 92). She concludes the
chapter like this:
"Above all, these programs reflect the lessons of all the experiments since Mao died, the
spirit of China’s 1995 aid reforms, and the continued emphasis on aid as a lubricant for
mutually beneficial cooperation. The $10 billion in preferential finance promised at the UN
Summit in 2005 would target turn- key infrastructure projects but it would also be available,
Hu said, for promoting cooperation between Chinese enterprises and those in developing
countries. The Millennium Development Goals and China’s own plan to “go global” came
together in this pledge.  It underlined the enormity of the resources available in China’s
coffers, and it was a wake-up call for the traditional donors. China, they could now see, was
a player in the global system of aid and development finance. But, as we shall see in the
next chapter, the mysterious new player with the large pot of money was not necessarily
going to be playing by the traditional rules."
(Brautigam, 2009: 104)
Chapter 4 describes the history and structure of the Chinese foreign aid, topics including China
Eximbank’s concessional loans, the Development Bank that doesn’t give aid, China’s medical aid,
Foreign-aid-based training, humanitarian aid, volunteer programs, “cash aid”, and dumping debt.
Continuously, the following chapter answers the question of how the Chinese aid works. Among
others, Brautigam uses Huawei as an example to illustrate how China mixes aid and commerce:
"(...) Huawei developed several projects with Sierratel, the state-owned telecommunications
company.  One  of  these,  financed  through  Chinese  foreign  aid,  involved  extending  the
wireless  telephone  system  operated  by  Sierratel.  There  were  no  bids  for  this  project.
“Huawei  proposed it  to  Sierratel,”  the  Chinese  ambassador  told  me.  Here  is  how the
process worked.
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Huawei negotiated and signed a preliminary contract for the project with Sierratel in July
2006, pending financing. Five months later, Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Finance and China’s
Ministry of Commerce signed a framework agreement, which provided the general terms for
taking and repaying a Chinese renminbi concessional loan of about $16.6 million.13 (The
frame- work agreement, concessional terms of the loan (2 percent interest,  twenty years
repayment),  and  the  fact  that  it  was  made  in  Chinese  currency,  establish  that  it  was
considered foreign aid by the Chinese.) The final loan agreement was signed in April 2007,
with China Eximbank. “It is one kind of aid,” China’s ambassador confirmed to me later
that year, adding “this is the first time Sierra Leone has used a concessional loan from the
Eximbank.”"
(Brautigam, 2009: 140)
She comments that “the Huawei experience shows the fruit of the Department of Foreign Aid’s
efforts early in the 1990s to “push” and “support” Chinese companies to find business overseas”
(ibid). Later in the chapter, she summarizes the key features of China’s approach compared with the
other donors: 
"(...) The focus on infrastructure, the mix of aid and other forms of economic engagement,
the deference to “ownership” (defined as African government ownership), the refusal to
accept  poverty  as  a  reason  to  go  slow  in  developing  debt-financed  infrastructure,  the
relative ease of the debt cancellation process, the search for creative ways to link Chinese
interests  in  “going  global”  (Huawei,  for  example)  with  local  interests  in  improving
infrastructure."
(Brautigam, 2009: 148)
Chapter 5 also addresses four key questions that are often misread by the mainstream media, the
West, and the mass population: conditionality,  tied aid,  the use of Chinese labour, and capacity
building. Compared to Western countries’ attaching explicit economic and political conditions to
their aid, China only requires certain preconditions for commercial projects and insists the partner
countries observe the "One China" policy (Brautigam, 2009: 150). 
As for the issue of tied aid, where recipients are required to use goods and services from the donor
country, Brautigam mentions it is common among Western countries, including the U.S., and China
is just “following in the footprints left by the wealthy countries” (Brautigam, 2009: 152). Despite
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the fact that Chinese projects usually employ more of their own nationals as staff than projects
carried out by other countries, Brautigam argues that “the ratio of Chinese workers to locals varies
enormously, depending on how long a Chinese company has been working in a country, how easy it
is to find skilled workers locally, and the local government’s policies on work permits” (Brautigam,
2009: 156). Last but not least, Brautigam reviews China’s effort in capacity building despite many
challenges:  they  provide  vocational  training,  university  scholarship  programs,  and  skill  and
technology transfers. In the end, she summarizes “How Does Chinese Aid and Engagement Work?”:
"China is different from the traditional donors in how it does aid. The political relationship
is very important everywhere and not simply in strategic countries. This fosters a lot of
genuine concern with government ownership, even if the government wants a new stadium
or a presidential residence. There is very little paternalism, and no conditionality on aid
(aside  from  the  One  China  policy).  Grants  and  zero-interest  loans  primarily  finance
diplomatic  investments:  politically  friendly  projects  that  are  sometimes  also  useful  for
development  (stadiums,  ministry  buildings,  irrigation  systems,  hospitals  and  schools,
bridges and roads). Concessional loans usually finance projects with potential for a clear
economic return (telecoms, energy, public utilities). The Chinese continue to return to repair
and  rehabilitate  former  projects,  sometimes  because  of  their  political  importance,
sometimes because they might now turn into a business venture. They work rapidly, using a
lot of skilled Chinese workers, but they usually employ many more Africans. China’s aid
experts still live simply and you will not find them in five-star hotels. But they are unlikely to
align their  aid with aid from the other  donors,  or  to  join efforts  at  aid harmonization,
particularly, it seems, if led by the World Bank.
On the  other  hand,  there  are  similarities.  Like  other  donors,  the  Chinese  have  not  yet
figured out how to build capacity or really transfer their skills. Their aid is still largely tied,
as it was for most of the traditional donors until recently. The Chinese have learned much
from other donors, particularly Japan, and their model of how aid connects to business. We
can see this most clearly from the active search for ways to finance construction in poor
countries with a lot of needs and business potential, but without much current revenue in
their budgets."
(Brautigam, 2009: 160-161)
In chapter 6, using figures from the Ministry of Finance's external assistance expenditure, China
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Eximbank concessional loans, and debt relief,  Brautigam estimates by 2009 China should have
committed almost $2.5 billions in official development aid to Africa and how it compares with the
other donors (Brautigam, 2009: 168-172). 
Fig 2.1 (Source: Brautigam, 2009: 170)
Fig. 2.2 (Sources: OECD/DAC statistics; World Bank Annual Reports; Brautigam, 2009: 172)
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The aid figures estimated above are “far smaller than the figures reported as ‘aid’ in the media and
even by other researchers” due to various miscalculations and confusions (Brautigam, 2009: 173-
174).  One mistake was an Associated Press story quoting a World Bank report,  saying China’s
premier admitting China had given Africa “more than $44 billion in aid” since beginning of its aid
program; but what China’s premier actually said was RMB 44 billion ($5.7 billion) (Brautigam,
2009:  177).  Another  big mistake that  has travelled across  the internet  for  a  while  is  from The
Economist,  who reported an erroneous figure of $1.8 billion for China’s “development aid” for
Africa in 2002, and it has became the source for several articles (Brautigam, 2009: 178). 
However, the figure $ 1.8 billion was “economic cooperation” instead of aid; it includes all the
work done by Chinese contractors in Africa, “whether the contract is paid by the World Bank, the
Africa  Development  Bank  (ADB),  an  African  government,  other  companies  that  hire  Chinese
engineering firms, or the Chinese government itself” (Brautigam, 2009: 179). 
Chapters 7 through 10 describe what China is actually doing in its aid program in Africa. Chapters 7
and 8 focus on industry, especially textiles. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on agriculture. Using various
cases, Brautigam talks about the challenges and opportunities the Chinese have brought to Africa
and how the “mutual benefit” is practised between both parties. 
The West, says Brautigam, has considered China to be a “rogue donor”. In chapter 11, she talks
about the myths and realities behind this title. First, she argues that Chinese aid is not all about oil,
minerals, and resources. 
For the claim that “China’s interest in Africa ‘seems confined to resource-rich (or ‘resource-cursed’)
countries, bypassing a large number of other African nations,’” she argues that China gives aid to
every single country in sub-Saharan Africa that follows the "One China" policy and that China does
not seem to give more official development aid to countries with more resources (Brautigam, 2009:
277-279):
"Resources matter, but China’s “mutual benefit” approach is about generating business.
African resources are definitely part of this. But there is much more. Exports, for example:
the  Chinese  exported  more  than  $50 billion  worth  of  equipment,  consumer  goods,  and
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machinery  to  Africa  in  2008.  China’s  single largest  Africa  investment  to  date  has  been
Industrial  and  Commercial  Bank  of  China’s  purchase  of  20  percent  of  South  Africa’s
Standard Bank for $5.6 billion. Contracts for infrastructure are hugely important. In 2007
alone,  Chinese  construction  companies  earned  revenues  of  $12.6  billion  and  signed
contracts for more than $29 billion in Africa. China’s telecom firm Huawei, constructing
phone systems across Africa,  earned more revenues than any other Chinese engineering
company world- wide in 2007. As a Nigerian diplomat told me in Beijing: “The Chinese are
trying to get involved in every sector of our economy. If you look at the West, it’s oil, oil, oil,
and nothing else.”"
(Brautigam, 2009: 279)
Second, while admitting that China did enable Sudan to get away with murder in Darfur, Brautigam
stresses that “China is changing” (Brautigam, 2009: 281). During a state visit to Sudan in early
2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao held “frank” discussions with Sudan’s President al-Bashir and
sent “clear, strong” messages (Brautigam, 2009: 282). Also, she argues that the Darfur crisis would
not likely have been easier to resolve even if China had agreed to the West’s sanctions efforts and
that  China  was  only  one  outside  player  among  many,  such  as  Russia,  Japan,  Canada,  etc.
(Brautigam, 2009: 283). 
She also comments on the common belief that Chinese support kept Robert Mugabe in power in
Zimbabwe,  drawing from her  own travel  to  Zimbabwe,  saying that  China  has  shown signs  of
change (Brautigam, 2009: 287-291). For China’s relationship with these 2 sensitive countries, she
says:
"In  Zimbabwe  and  Sudan,  the  Chinese  were  opportunistic.  They  took  advantage  of
situations  of  stark,  government-sponsored  repression  that  have  horrified  and  mobilized
many to protest. They could have done much more, much earlier, to exercise their growing
ability to be a persuasive and responsible stakeholder. To their credit, the US, Britain, and
their allies played an active role in putting pressure on Mugabe. Yet we would do better in
pushing China to change if we had more evidence that our own tactics, including sanctions,
embargoes, and even armed intervention, as in Iraq, resulted in social justice, stability, and
prosperity for the people our governments mean to help."
(Brautigam, 2009: 292)
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As for the issues of China hurting efforts to strengthen democracy and human rights, Brautigam
argues that first China’s engagement with Africa has not significantly changed the playing field
(Brautigam, 2009: 284). “China’s rise has clearly given dictators additional financing options, but
finance from China differs little from the other options readily open to most African dictators”
(Brautigam, 2009: 285). Plus, political conditions attached by other donors to foreign aid have not
been effective in improving human rights and democracy in Africa either (ibid). For the belief that
“China is making corruption worse,” Brautigam disagrees with the three common categories of
concerns regarding the corruption issue. 
First, she argues that even though China is lending a lot of money to Africa, there is actually scant
opportunity for corruption. This is because “China’s system of aid and development finance does
not work the way a loan works from the IMF or the World Bank, or for that matter, from a private
bank; the fact that China Eximbank loans are not usually disbursed to the borrowing government in
weak states helps reduce corruption; keeping the money in China and using escrow accounts filled
by receipts  from natural  resource  exports  as  guarantees,  means  that  there  is  also  a  little  less
opportunity  for  the  kind  of  wholesale  embezzlement  sadly  common  in  some  resource-rich
countries” (Brautigam, 2009: 293-294). 
For the second concern — “the potential for padding of expenses, sweetheart deals, collusion and
bid-rigging, and kickbacks,” Brautigam thinks “from China we see mixed messages on the issue of
corruption overseas, leading to the conclusion that it will be some time before these practices are
even made illegal, a necessary first step” (Brautigam, 2009: 295):
"On the one hand, during his 2006 visit to Africa, Premier Wen Jiabao met with a large
group  of  Chinese  entrepreneurs  in  Zambia  and  laid  down  clear expectations  about
corporate governance: “Our enterprises must conform to international rules when running
businesses, must be open and transparent, should go through a bidding process for big
projects, forbid inappropriate deals and reject corruption and kickbacks.” China was also a
sponsor of,  and has signed and ratified,  the UN Convention Against  Corruption,  which
stipulates that bribery overseas be made a crime. … …
On the other hand, like many other export credit agencies, China’s Export Import Bank
(Eximbank)  is  not  averse  to  funding  contracts  awarded  under  the  kind  of  no-bid
arrangements  Wen  Jiabao  warned  against  in  Zambia.  In  Japan,  the  corruption  that
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accompanied a similar system created a societal backlash against corporate involvement in
aid. This kind of pressure is unlikely to happen any time soon in China. When queried in
2007  about  his  bank’s  policies  on  transparency,  Eximbank's  president,  Li  Ruogu
commented: “In China, we have a saying: If the water is too clear, you don’t catch any
fish.”"
(Brautigam, 2009: 295-296)
Third, Brautigam points out that it is not the case that “China’s willingness to lend in countries
without imposing broad conditions about transparency might make those countries turn away from
other financiers with stronger safeguards”: 
"As for donors, a study published in 2008 by New York University economists Bill Easterly
and Tobias Pfutze showed that donors were still giving an average of 68 percent of their aid
to countries ranked at the bottom of the corruption scale. Some donors (Greece, Australia,
Portugal,  Ire-  land,  the  European Bank for  Reconstruction  and Development,  and New
Zealand)  gave  more  than  80  percent  of  their  aid  to  the  most  corrupt  countries.  With
examples like this from the West, it is difficult to point to China as the odd man out."
(Brautigam, 2009: 297)
As a non-member of OECD, China does not have full obligation to follow OECD regulations on
export  credit.  Many people tend to  believe that  Chinese aid and loans  are  part  of a system of
“unfair” subsidies. Brautigam argues that:
"China Eximbank and Sinosure are well aware of the evolving norms for export credits.
Several years ago, the Chinese translated the text of the OECD Arrangement into Chinese.
Eximbank’s  website  stresses  that  its  export  buyer’s  credits  “generally”  follow  the
Arrangement,  even though China is  not a member of the OECD. At  the same time,  the
Chinese believe that companies in wealthier countries got a head-start with assistance from
their  governments,  under  rules  that  were  changed  before  Chinese  firms  became global
players. The United States’ Eximbank was established in 1934; China’s only in 1994. They
are unlikely to agree to put their companies on a level playing field without spending a few
more  years  learning  how  to  “go  global.”  This  issue  will  continue  to  be  a  bone  of
contention."
(Brautigam, 2009: 299)
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The last part in chapter 11 addresses china’s lack of social and environmental conditions. Brautigam
believes that the situation may be changing, at least for China’s policy banks (Brautigam, 2009:
299).
Exploiting labour practices, ignorance of local labour regulations, subcontracting to get away with
responsibility are among many common problems, while hydro power projects are “at the centre of
much of the social and environmental critique of China’s role in Africa” (Brautigam, 2009: 302).
However, “China has been on a steep learning curve on environmental issues and corporate social
responsibility – part of President Hu Jintao’s pledge to build a ‘harmonious society’” (Brautigam,
2009: 303). Chinese banks and ministries have shown eagerness to get relevant training on social
and environmental principles. The concept of social responsibility, thought still new in China, has
started to gain more attention.
In her final conclusion,  Brautigam holds a firm belief that China is not a “rogue donor”:
 "China’s rise in Africa is cause for some concern, but it need not evoke the level of fear and
alarm raised by some who have condemned China’s aid and engagement as destabilizing,
bad for governance, and unlikely to help Africa to end poverty. Many of the fears about
Chinese aid and engagement are misinformed, the alarm out of proportion.  First of all,
China’s aid is not huge; the traditional donors give far more aid to Africa. China’s export
credits are much larger than its aid, but not as large as commonly believed. Their novel
approach in  Angola,  the  Congo,  and elsewhere  applies  the  system China  learned from
Japan: using very large credits, at  competitive market rates, tied to Chinese machinery,
equipment, and construction services, with repayment in oil or other resources. This is the
essence of the “win-win” approach."
(Brautigam, 2009: 307)
Throughout the book, Brautigam makes it clear that China has always stuck to the “mutual benefit”
principle. Using historical data, she argues that the China-Africa relationship has been established
long ago, as opposed to the common belief that China only stepped into Africa in modern days for
the pursuit of natural resources. Also, Brautigam tackles many myths and provides the readers with
reality through using her personal experience in Africa, relevant studies, and own research results.
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In the end of the book, she describes China using its own experience in helping Africa as such:
"At the end of the day,  we should remember this:  China’s own experiments have raised
hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, largely without foreign aid. They believe in
investment, trade, and technology as levers for development, and they are applying these
same tools  in  their  African  engagement,  not  out  of  altruism but  because  of  what  they
learned  at  home.  They  learned  that  their  own  natural  resources  could  be  assets  for
modernization  and  prosperity.  They  learned  that  a  central  government  engaging  china
commitment to capitalist business development could rapidly reduce poverty. They learned
that  special  zones  could attract  clusters of  mature industries  from the West  and Japan,
providing jobs and technologies.  These lessons emphasize not aid,  but  experiments; not
paternalism, but the “creative destruction” of  competition and the green shoots of  new
opportunities. This may be the dragon’s ultimate, ambiguous gift."
(Brautigam, 2009: 311-312)
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2.4 "The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations."
Erica S. Downs, a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, is the
author of the article "The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations." In it, she examines
and  discusses  a  range  of  what  she  refers  to  as  "widely  accepted  "facts"  about  the  growing
involvement of China's [national oil companies] in Africa" (Downs, 2007: 42). 
In this section, the myths presented by Downs and her responses to them will be examined. In
particular, the ultimate and penultimate of these are directly relevant to some of the criticisms of
Chinese involvement presented earlier in this chapter. 
The first myth: "China's oil companies are 'locking out' Western oil companies from Africa." "No,"
argues Downs, "China's oil companies are relatively small players in Africa" (Downs, 2007: 43).
Referring to the consulting firm Wood Mackenzie's analysis, Downs shows that the commercial
value of the oil investments in Africa of China's national oil companies "is just 8 percent of the
combined commercial value of the international oil companies' investments in African oil and 3
percent of all companies invested in African oil" (Downs, 2007: 44). Furthermore, she shows that
Chinese oil investments are concentrated mainly in Sudan, with two large projects under way in
Angola and Nigeria (Downs, 2007: 45). 
She continues her argument that Chinese oil-related investments in Africa are relatively modest due
to the heavy competition for African oil, with projections showing West Africa accounting for 38
percent of global oil production by 2010, second only to the Middle East as an oil producing region
(ibid.). The main reason, Downs concludes, that China's national oil companies have had a difficult
time  penetrating  the  African  oil  production  market  is  that  resource  nationalism has  been  less
rampant in Africa than other regions as a result of lacking competencies within the African national
oil  companies, and although China may have deep pockets, the Chinese oil  companies are also
lacking in needed competencies to secure the most desired blocks, such as those in the deep waters
of the Gulf of Guinea. As an example, she brings up that the shares awarded to Sinopec for three
ultra-deepwater blocks relinquished by Western oil companies were smaller than initially bid for
due to lacking capacities that the Angolans required for full participation (Downs, 2007: 46-47). 
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The second myth presented by Downs is that "China's oil companies are taking oil off the world
market." This statement, Downs (2007: 47) rejects. She argues that such an argument is unfounded,
and that "[any] foreign oil production that China's [national oil companies] send to China merely
replaces oil that China would have to buy from other countries." She points to, first of all, that
China only ships home 221,000 b/d out of the total 685,000 b/d produced by Chinese oil companies
abroad, but even if they did ship everything home, this would lessen the barrels already purchased
by China from Angola and Saudi-Arabia, two of the main suppliers to the U.S. market, by about
half a million barrels per day, and "actually expanding rather than contracting the amount of oil
available to other consumers through their overseas operations, especially through the development
of oil fields that other oil companies are unable or unwilling to invest in" (Downs, 2007: 47). 
The third myth Downs presents is that "China's oil companies' African activities reflect a highly
coordinated government strategy." This, too, is refuted by Downs: 
"The "China, Inc." model that many international observers use to describe the overseas  
investments of Chinese firms in general, and the Chinese oil companies in particular, is far 
less coherent than is often assumed. Beijing has certainly encouraged China's [national oil 
companies to expand internationally, provided them with varying levels of diplomatic and 
financial  support,  and  occasionally  intervened  in  the  companies'  foreign  investment  
decision-making. However, when it comes to choosing where to invest, the companies are 
almost always in the driver's seat and the Chinese government, while occasionally offering 
general advice about the direction they should travel (for example, "invest in Morocco"), is 
often just along for the ride with little idea of the final destination. Sudan's recent omission 
from the Chinese government's catalog of countries that Chinese companies are encouraged
to invest in is a case in point: this absence has not prevented CNPC from continuing to  
invest there." 
(Downs, 2007: 48). 
Downs continues to shift the perspective, from that of foreign critics, to the Chinese companies
themselves and Chinese commentators. Indeed, she finds that many of them are critical of Chinese
authorities for the lack of a central governing strategy abroad and its resulting poor coordination
between different Chinese companies, and between the companies and Beijing (Downs, 2007: 49).
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The underlying reason for this state of affairs, argues Downs, is, in part, the central government's
limited capacity to control the activities of Chinese national oil companies; a result of a shift in
power and resources away from the central government toward the state-owned energy companies
(Downs, 2007: 49). A further problem with the relationship between companies and authorities is
the fragmentation and lack of coordination within the government itself. Downs points to the fact
that even though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a broad mandate to support Chinese
firms abroad,  "Chinese diplomats have complained that they often do not  learn about  overseas
investments made by the [national oil companies] until after the fact" [Downs, 2007: 49-50). 
Yet another issue that speaks against the notion that Chinese companies are engaged in a centrally
coordinated strategy, is the case of rivalry between the Chinese companies themselves, competing
not only for contracts and assets, but also for political advantage in Beijing. Downs (2007: 50)
reports that this issue had reached the attention of the highest political authorities in Beijing by the
fall of 2005. Chinese oil companies had increasingly found themselves in direct competition with
one another  for  projects  abroad,  something which  pushed the  rate  of  returns  down for  project
winners, again leading to diminishing dividends for the stock holders: the Chinese government. One
example of this in action was when CNPC and Sinopec competed against each other for a pipeline
project in Sudan. Downs (2007: 50) reports that "Chinese diplomats and the China International
Contractors Association unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Sinopec, the company that entered
the lower bid, to withdraw from the competition." 
The fourth myth presented by Downs (2007: 51) is that "State financial support for China's oil
companies is unfair to Western oil companies competing for acreage in Africa." With regards to
this, Downs concedes that it is the case. However, she continues to state that its effects have been
exaggerated,  as  China's  national  oil  companies  do  not  have  a  competitive  advantage  over  oil
companies  that  do  not  receive  similar  funding  from  their  own  governments  despite  Beijing's
economic size. Downs points to that while the deep pockets of Beijing might have helped Sinopec
obtain assets  in  Angola,  many other  attempts for Chinese companies  to  acquire  assets  in other
African countries in exchange for aid or Chinese investment in other economic sectors have not
borne fruit (ibid.). Furthermore, Downs points out, the majority of the assets offered to Chinese
national oil companies as parts of investment deals are assets that have been passed over by other
international oil companies. 
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The main reason Beijing gives for providing economic support for its national oil companies is the
perception  that  the  Chinese  companies,  as  late-comers  to  the  market,  are  at  a  comparative
disadvantage to the Western companies which have held sway for decades already before the arrival
of their Chinese would-be competitors, often with monopolies. An example Downs brings up is
Shell, which entered Nigeria in 1938 and held a monopoly on oil production until the country's
independence in 1960, and remains Nigeria's largest oil producer (Downs, 2007: 52). The Chinese
perspective is backed by CNOOC Chairman and CEO, Fu Chengyu, who states: "[i]t is actually not
easy for us to find projects. The oil market already has more than 100 years of history and all of the
good projects are already taken. As a newcomer, it is obviously not easy to do well" (ibid.). 
As a further complication, a sustained increase in petroleum prices for the last decade has shifted
bargaining power in the favour of oil-producing countries and away from foreign companies. This
has  led to  a  growing incentive for  oil-producing states to  both establish their  own national  oil
companies and increase their taxation of foreign companies. Additionally, some of the African oil-
producing  states  lack  critical  infrastructure  in  other  sectors  of  their  economy and  have  found
themselves increasingly eager to diversify their economies beyond oil production and have, from
this new position of relative strength, begun offering preferential access to companies willing to
link oil investments to investments in other sectors of their economy (Downs, 2007: 52). It is with
these package deals, the Chinese companies can compete with established international companies
despite their lack of competitiveness within the oil industry alone. 
An important  tool  for  Chinese  oil  companies,  and by their  extension,  the  Chinese  government
abroad, is the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank). At the time of Downs' article, the
world's third largest export credit agency, its principal mandate is to “implement state policies in
industry, foreign trade and economy, finance and foreign affairs” (Downs, 2007: 52). Downs reports
that in private conversations, senior Chinese officials have stated that “all of China Eximbank's
loans are offered on concessionary terms, with some more generous than others” (ibid.). However,
despite this, in recent years the cash flows of China's national oil companies have reduced their
dependence on government loans, but they still take advantage of this opportunity (Downs, 2007:
53). 
When it comes to the financial support from China Eximbank, it materializes in three forms. One, it
has extended lines of credit for Chinese national oil companies to fund overseas exploration and
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development. Two, it provides financing for specific acquisitions abroad, easing the Chinese oil
companies'  access  to  such  financing.  And,  three,  China  Eximbank  indirectly  supports  foreign
acquisitions by China's national oil companies through investment in infrastructure in the African
countries in question (Downs, 2007: 53). 
The  result  of  this  financial  support  is  that  China's  national  oil  companies  have  established  a
footprint in Angola that they may otherwise not have been able to acquire. Downs (2007: 53) argues
that it would be unlikely for the Angolan national oil company, Sonangol, to have rejected the deal
between Shell and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) for ONGC to buy Shell's
50 percent stake in the Greater Plutonio fields, and rather award it to Sinopec, had it not been for
the $2 billion loan from China Eximbank. Another example is the decision to award block 3/80 to
Sinopec  after  not  renewing  French  oil  producer  Total's  licence  for  it,  following  the  French
investigation into illegal arms sales to Angola in the early 1990s (Downs, 2007: 54). 
However, Downs also points to how Chinese oil-for-infrastructure deals have been less successful
elsewhere in Africa. An example is Nigeria, which was mentioned above as a market difficult for
Chinese companies to penetrate which in the oil sector is heavily dominated by Shell, where a 2006
agreement between CNPC and the Nigerian government to let the company invest $2 billion in the
dilapidated Kaduna refinery in exchange for the right of first refusal in more desirable blocks fell
apart in the following year (Downs, 2007: 54). 
Furthermore, Downs points to another deal involving a $2.5 railroad project for several Nigerian oil
blocks fell apart over disagreements between Abuja and CNOOC over interest rates, and in Kenya
CNOOC has been forced to return four out of six exploration blocks it received as a part of several
infrastructure deals during Chinese president Hu Jintao's visit in April 2006 (Downs, 2007: 54). 
On China's national oil companies' access to oil assets through state-to-state deals, Downs explains:
“[It] has sounded alarm bells in Western capitals because it is unfair to oil companies that 
do not receive similar benefits from their governments. The United States, for example, has 
a  longstanding  policy  of  limiting  government  intervention  on  behalf  of  American  oil  
companies. If the United States were to engage in such behavior, it would encourage other 
countries to do the same, creating a race that no one would win because there will always 
be a state willing to provide more. Indeed, it was precisely the high costs of the export credit
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competition among the industrial states in the 1950s and 1960s that led them to develop  
rules to manage official trade finance” 
(Downs, 2007: 54-55). 
Today this sort of competition has begun to emerge among Asian national oil companies looking to
secure projects in African states, particularly in Nigeria, where the minister of state for petroleum
has, according to Downs, indicated that “right of first refusal on oil blocks will be awarded to those
companies  whose  governments  can  offer  attractive  economic  packages”  (Downs,  2007:  55).
However,  as  of  yet  this  has  not  significantly altered the power balance in  favour  of  the Asian
national oil companies as they do not possess the capabilities required to explore and operate the
most  desirable  assets.  “However,” Downs (2007: 55) notes,  “state  financial  support for China's
NOCs will  pose more  of  a  challenge  to  the  IOCs when the  Chinese  oil  companies  eventually
acquire these capabilities or if they compete against through joint bids with companies that do have
them.”
Finally, Downs also points to the fact that Chinese national oil companies are able to grow and
acquire competencies and capabilities in markets such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya which are closed off
to most international oil companies due to sanctions placed on those countries by the companies'
own governments. In addition, moves by major oil producers like Venezuela and Russia to limit
foreign  presence  in  the  oil  sector  has  limited  investment  opportunities  for  international  oil
companies to a much greater degree than competition with Chinese companies (Downs, 2007: 55).
The fifth myth Downs presents is that "China's loans to Angola weaken the IMF's efforts to improve
oil revenue transparency." Downs (2007: 56) agrees that this is probable, but only part of the story.
She posits that the conventional wisdom about why the IMF's leverage over Angola's transparency
of  petroleum revenue  and  management  has  been  weakened  by  China's  willingness  to  finance
ventures with few or no questions asked. Downs reports:
“After the end of Angola's 27-year civil war in 2002, Luanda indicated to the IMF that it 
wanted to work toward establishing a formal financial arrangement. This would aid the  
reconstruction of the country's economy by giving Angola access to lending facilities from 
the IMF and other donors, including the Paris Club, an informal group of official creditors 
whose permanent members include 19 of the world's wealthiest nations. When the Angolan 
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government's negotiations with the IMF over the creation of a Staff Monitored Program – 
the first step toward a formal financial arrangement – stalled on the issue of transparency, 
China Eximbank made Luanda an offer it reportedly couldn't refuse: billions of dollars in 
loans  (the  current  amount  is  estimated  at  $12  billion)  with  low  interest  rates,  long  
maturities, and no questions asked about management of oil monies. The only condition  
imposed by China Eximbank, at least on the initial $2 billion loan offered in 2004, was that 
the money be released on a project by project basis with 70 percent of the construction to be
performed by Chinese firms.”
(Downs, 2007: 56). 
However, Downs also points out that this did not happen in a vacuum. From the time the Angolan
civil war ended up to the global financial crisis, the oil prices almost tripled, from $26 per barrel in
2001 to $66 per barrel in 2006 (Downs, 2007: 57) and up to today's level of approximately $100 per
barrel.  In addition to that,  in the first  five years after  the civil  war, Angolan production nearly
doubled, from 742,000 barrels per day to 1.4 million barrels per day (ibid.). This, Downs continues,
accounts for an annual oil revenue increase from $7 billion to $34 billion, with a cumulative value
of $100 billion. 
This, Downs argues, is much more significant for explaining Luanda's changing view on its own
position with relation to the IMF and the Paris Club, than the Chinese loans. Furthermore, she
points out that only a small fraction of the credit lines offered by China Eximbank have actually
materialized due to the limited capacity of Luanda to find national firms with the competence to
undertake such projects, despite the 70 percent that would be covered by Chinese firms (Downs,
2007: 57). 
Another argument that Downs puts forth against  the notion that Chinese money has obstructed
transparency is the fact that Luanda has become increasingly transparent with regards to its  oil
revenue.  She  points  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance  having  published  information  on  its  website
regarding oil revenue, production, and payments received on a block-by-block basis, and that the
2005-2006 licensing  round was  made  transparent  by publishing  and making  publicly available
details of signing bonuses and commitments to social projects (Downs, 2007: 57). 
The sixth, and final, myth presented by Downs is that "Chinese oil investments in Sudan undermine
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international efforts to end the Darfur crisis." Downs (2007: 58) accepts this, however, she argues
that China's behaviour is changing. She agrees that the substantial investments in Sudanese oil by
the Chinese national oil company CNPC has been a factor in the reluctance of Chinese authorities to
press the Khartoum regime on atrocities in Darfur.  However,  she continues to argue that these
arguments have become outdated as Beijing has stepped up its involvement in finding a solution to
the crisis in the troubled south. 
As a background for Chinese petroleum involvement in Sudan, Downs writes this:
“CNPC's operations in Sudan have a pride of place in China because they are considered 
by Chinese oil analysts to be the most successful foreign investments made by China's NOCs
to date. CNPC first entered Sudan in 1995, eight years before the Darfur crisis erupted. The 
company took advantage of the dearth of competition from other oil companies (due to  
Sudan's  north-south  civil  war  and U.S.  sanctions)  to  establish  itself  as  the  largest  oil  
producer and investor in Sudan. CNPC pumps more oil in Sudan than it does in any other 
country with the exception of Kazakhstan. The company's Sudanese assets are valued at  
about $7 billion. The crown jewel among them is a 40 percent stake in the Greater Nile  
Petroleum  Operating  Company  (GNPOC)  –  a  joint  venture  that  includes  Malaysia's  
Petronas, India's ONGC and Sudan's Sudapet – which produces most of the country's oil.  
CNPC's investments helped transform Sudan from a net importer to a net exporter of oil in 
1999, just as world oil prices began to rise from less than $15 per barrel in 1998” 
(Downs, 2007: 58). 
It was the combination of these investments and Beijing's hard-line view on national sovereignty
that  accounted  for  China's  initial  reluctance  to  interfere  with,  and  press  Khartoum  on,  the
burgeoning and eventually atrocious crisis in Darfur. To begin with, Beijing repeatedly obstructed
sanctions on the Khartoum regime in the United Nations Security Council  (Downs, 2007:  59).
Downs points to a statement by former deputy minister of foreign affairs, Zhou Wenzhong, in 2004:
“[b]usiness is business. We try to separate business from politics. Secondly, I think internal relations
in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them” (ibid.). 
However, the Chinese discovered that separating business from politics is often not as simple as one
would  hope.  Despite  CNPC  entering  the  country  with  the  intentions  of  assuming  a  strictly
commercial role, it found itself entangled in political matters as its international perceptions were
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affected by its dealings with a regime with policies of ethnic killings (Downs, 2007: 59). Downs
continues: 
“The damage done to China's international reputation by the Darfur atrocities has been  
substantial. The view in many Western capitals is that China has been shielding Khartoum 
in the UNSC, filling Khartoum's coffers with oil revenues, and selling arms that government 
forces are using indiscriminately against the Darfur rebels as well as civilians. As China has
come under increased criticism for its actions, the country has begun to shift its policy on 
Sudan” 
(Downs, 2007: 60). 
The pressure that has materialized over China's handling of the Sudan issue has ranged from the
“U.S. government (…) encouraging China to demonstrate that it is a “responsible stakeholder” by
using whatever leverage it has over Khartoum (..) to prod Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to
moderate  his  position  on  Darfur”  (Downs,  2007:  60)  to  “Hollywood  actress  Mia  Farrow
[threatening] to launch a worldwide campaign against the Beijing “Genocide Olympics” because of
China's  stance  on  Sudan”  (ibid).  Additionally,  Downs  points  to  other  African  countries  being
concerned  with  the  situation  in  Sudan  and  China  having  to  consider  that  for  potential  future
business. 
A second factor behind China's new perspective on Sudan Downs brings up, is the realization by
Beijing  that  the  international  community  would  have  to  respond  to  the  Darfur  crisis  in  some
manner, and it would much rather be a part of the decision-making process than be put on the
sidelines. As such, it would be able to protect its economic interests while still helping to redeem its
international reputation (Downs, 2007: 60). 
Downs reports that during the year preceding her article, Beijing has received much praise on its
shift in policy toward Sudan, from Washington, London, and the United Nations. She points out that
both Chinese and American government officials have stated that Beijing played a critical role in
ensuring the permission for a joint U.N.-African Union peacekeeping force to be deployed in the
troubled areas, a part of which is 275 Chinese military engineers (Downs, 2007: 61). As an example
of the praise toward Beijing's shift, Downs reports:
“During his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2007, 
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U.S.  Special  Envoy  for  Sudan Andrew Natsios  complimented  China's  subtle  behind-the-
scenes  diplomacy  toward  Sudan  as  a  useful  complement  to  the  blunt,  highly-visible  
approach taken by the United States. His remarks echo those made in private conversations 
by Chinese foreign policy officials and analysts who maintain that the United States, which 
usually plays the “bad cop,” needs China to assume the role of “good cop” for progress to 
be made in negotiations with countries such as Sudan, Iran and North Korea.”
(Downs, 2007: 61). 
The official stance from Beijing on why it has continued its economic engagement in Sudan despite
the Darfur crisis is that it is rooted in two main reasons. The first is connected to the quotes above;
that by maintaining contact China achieves leverage not held by other states, such as the U.S., who
cut ties. The second reason is the perception that the crisis is rooted in poverty, and that Chinese
investments can help resolve the crisis through economic development (Downs, 2007: 61). 
Downs sums up this section by arguing that China could have used its economic leverage over
Khartoum to do more, however, Beijing alone might not have been sufficient to resolve the crisis,
and  other  governments,  whose  weak  responses  have  escaped  scrutiny  by  using  China  as  a
convenient scapegoat, are also to blame for the lack of international response to the Darfur atrocities
(Downs, 2007: 62).
To sum up, Downs argues that the perceptions of China's involvement in Africa is a mixture of facts
and fiction. Falling into the fiction category, she argues, are the myths pertaining to the size and
scope of Chinese investments as well as that the Chinese companies have an advantage over other
international  companies involved in Africa.  More factual criticisms,  she concedes,  are  those on
Beijing undermining transparency of oil revenue, particularly in Angola, and obstructing attempts to
end human rights abuses in Sudan. However, in relation to both of these, this is not the whole story,
and  these  criticisms  are  becoming  outdated  as  Beijing's  policy  on  Khartoum and  oil  revenue
transparency in Angola are both changing. Finally, Downs concludes:
“The  activities  of  China's  [national  oil  companies]  have  loomed  large  in  analyses  of  
China's overall deepening engagement with Africa. The NOC's quest for reserves and profits
and China's growing demand for oil are key drivers of Beijing's African diplomacy. Yet, the 
higher profile of oil security on the foreign policy agendas of many countries – due to high 
oil prices and rising resource nationalism – has also focused international attention on  
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Africa. The oil industry is often the subject of “fuzzy thinking.” Separating fact from fiction 
with respect to the growing footprint of China's NOCs in Africa is important for policy-
makers and opinion leaders around the world seeking to understand the implication of  
deepening Sino-African engagement for their own countries.”
(Downs, 2007: 63-64).
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2.5 Economic Development Theory.
One of the most commonly used economic models in development economics is the Solow model.
It  looks at what determines a country’s capital stock in the long run. In this section,  it  will be
explained how the model works, and how it can be applied in the case of Sino-African relations.
First, one needs to understand the concept that a nation’s growth is caused by its investment (I).
Investment, on the other hand, comes from saving (S). That is: S = I. Now we assume saving is a
fixed share of income (S = sY) and income is a function of labour and capital (Y = F(K, L)).
Capital stock is depreciated through time, and we use  to denote the depreciated share. Thus, we
can calculate the capital growth from time t to t+1 is Kt+1 - Kt  = It – Kt . Replacing I using sY, we
get Kt+1 - Kt = sYt – Kt . The equation implies that capital grows (Kt+1 > Kt) as long as savings (sYt)
exceeds depreciation of existing capital stock ( Kt). 
In this economic model, there is a “steady state” where capital accumulation stops, or K t+1 - Kt = 0.
At  this  steady state,  sY =  K,  ie.  sF(K*,  L)= K*.  K* indicates  that  the  capital  stock  is  in
equilibrium; below this level, saving exceeds what is needed to maintain existing capital, and the
capital stock grows; Above this level, saving is not sufficient to maintain the existing capital stock,
and the capital  stock shrinks. It  implies that growth occurs until the long-term level of income
F(K*, L) is reached (see Fig. 2.3).
41
Fig 2.3. (Source: Gärtner, 2013)
One important empirical observation is that some very poor countries do not grow at all. They seem
to be stuck at low levels of capital stock. The mechanism which makes it very difficult for people to
escape poverty is called the “poverty trap”. Many African countries, for example Tanzania, Zambia,
Kenya, etc., are considered to be in this trap. Economists have discussed the possible mechanisms
that prevent the growth, for example economies of scale and subsistence consumption. In short, at
low level  of manufacturing,  those poor countries cannot  improve technology or human capital,
which ends up in a vicious cycle of poverty.
So what can we do to help these countries out of poverty? Jeffrey Sachs (2005), in his book "The
end of Poverty" argues “our explanation is that tropical Africa, even well-governed parts, is stuck in
a poverty trap, too poor to achieve robust, high levels of economic growth, and, in many places,
simply too poor to grow at all… We argue that what is needed is a ‘big push’ in public investment.” 
In the figure below, K stands for required investment, and sY stands for investment. When K is
bigger than sY, required investment exceeds investment. In this case, the country does not have
enough  investment  to  meet  the  growth  requirement,  thus,  it  cannot  get  richer.  Only  when  the
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country is  to  the right  of  the “poverty threshold”,  its  investment  actually exceeds the required
amount and the country has the opportunity to grow.
 
Fig 2.4. (Source: Gärtner, 2013) 
Sadly, most African countries are in the poverty trap. Easterly (2003) argues that many economists
in the institutions making aid policy would be 
“(...) uncomfortable with the financing gap model that aid has a high likelihood of raising 
investment, which in turn has a high likelihood of raising economic growth. Yet the idea that
“aid buys growth” is an integral part of the founding myth and ongoing mission of the aid 
bureaucracies. The aid bureaucracies define their final objective as “poverty reduction”  
(today's more politically correct term for growth), and their immediate output as aid money 
disbursed.”
(Easterly, 2003: 31). 
It's important to note here, that Easterly is not using the same definition of aid as this paper. Rather,
his use of the term aid refers to traditional Western aid seeking to improve conditions in developing
countries by non-market measures. 
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Continuing, Easterly points to a Canadian aid project to assist farmers in the mountains in Lesotho
gain access to markets by road construction and develop modern methods of livestock management
and grain production. The problem with this was that, as the recipients of the aid already knew, the
grain production was not competitive due to the region's poor growing conditions, and the major
long term effect was that South African grain was brought into the region, thus driving the local
grain producers out of business (Easterly, 2003: 36). 
To underline his point, Easterly points to an inverse relationship between increased aid (again, in
non-market terms) and economic growth (see Fig. 2.5). In his article, Easterly (2003) argues that
rather than focusing on small uncontroversial methods of development aid, Western countries and
aid agencies should focus on large-scale investments in developing countries to push them out of
the poverty trap.
Fig 2.5 (Source: Easterly, 2003: 35). 
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2.6 Development from a Chinese Perspective.
When it comes to development seen in a context of Chinese involvement in Africa, it is important to
examine how Beijing views development within China itself.  This insight aids in understanding
Chinese  actions  and choices  in  their  involvement  with  Africa.  Chinese  scholar  Suisheng Zhao
(2010,  p.  425-430)  points  to  four  crucial  aspects  of  Chinese  reform and  development  policy;
institutionalization  of  decision-making  system  and  intra-party  democracy,  cadre  accountability,
constitutional reform, and reform of Communist Party rule. 
The first of these aspects, institutionalization of decision-making system and intra-party democracy,
can be compared to what one in Western foreign aid terms refer to as ”good governance” with the
one crucial distinction that Beijing does not include a wider Western-style democracy with multi-
party  elections.  That  is,  good  governance  with  functional,  accountable  and  effective  state
institutions without demands for free elections and freedom of speech. 
The second aspect, cadre accountability, can be seen as a part of of the development of institutions,
as local government representatives, cadres, are accountable to central authorities with regards to
decisions, implementation, and achieving set goals. Specifically, this would in China mean that the
local cadres are servants of the system instead of themselves. 
The third aspect, of constitutional reform, is not what in Western terms would often be to change the
constitution in any particular direction (i.e., towards a more democratic one, or with the inclusion of
more  rights,  etc.),  rather  the  goal  of  constitutional  reform from the  Chinese  perspective  is  to
improve government efficiency, allowing for a more transparent, predictable, and stable rule.  
As  the  third  aspect,  the  matter  of  reform  of  Communist  Party  rule,  is  not  a  Western  style
democratization, but a party process from which the Party can retain its position in Chinese politics
and  civic  life  through  reforms  to  maintain  legitimacy,  ability  to  govern,  efficiency,  and  be
representative  enough to  provide  policy for  different  interest  groups  and thus  not  alienate  any
important interest groups or minorities. 
This is interesting in the context of involvement in Africa because it is exemplified in the Guardian
article by David Smith (2013) earlier in this chapter, and particularly in Erica Downs' (2007) article
on Sino-African energy relations. For the latter, Downs goes into some of China's dealings with
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regimes that are not viewed in a very positive light in the Western World, Sudan in particular. By
applying these principles, one can achieve a greater understanding of Chinese goals and the results
of its actions in the country. 
For instance,  unlike Western critics, China is not interested in democratization of the al-Bashar
regime in Khartoum. They are, however, interested in an accountable and legitimate regime with
which trade can be had without alienation of other groups; as Downs mentioned, other African
countries which expressed concern with the situation in Darfur and China's involvement with the
regime, but also currently with the newly established state of South Sudan. 
Additionally, the issue of cadre accountability is important for a heavily centralized government
structure such as Beijing. Both in the sense that Beijing needs their representatives in Sudan to not
act by individual self-interest, with the same going for the Khartoum regime's representatives in
local business, so business can go smoothly, but also that managers are accountable to the local
population and the labour force to avoid potential political and labour-related unrest. 
On the topic of how China perceives development aid, Brautigam (2009: 29-30) also adds another
perspective. She reports that 
“The Cold War shaped foreign policy and aid in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For 
nearly four years after the defeat of Japan in World War II, a civil war continued to rage in 
China. In 1949, Mao Zedong and the communist People’s Liberation Army pushed Chiang 
Kai-shek’s  People’s  Party  (Kuomintang)  and the  government  of  the  Republic  of  China  
(ROC) into retreat on the island of Taiwan. The two sides, PRC and ROC, faced each other 
in an undeclared truce across the Gulf of Taiwan, which after 1950 was patrolled by the US 
Seventh  Fleet.  Although  Britain  and  the  Nordic  countries  (Sweden,  Finland,  Norway,  
Denmark) recognized the new government in Beijing, the United States refused.”
(Brautigam, 2009: 29). 
This,  she  argues  is  a  central  factor  of  understanding China's  view on national  sovereignty and
Beijing's reluctance to interfere in the domestic policies of other countries. With a history of not
being recognized as the masters of their own land, the Chinese Communist Party is reluctant to
force their views on developing countries now that they are in the position of power. 
46
When looking at the Chinese foreign aid programmes, Brautigam goes back to the Korean war to
find its inception:
"In  1950,  North  Korea  invaded  the  South,  and  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  
authorized troops to help South Korean President Syngman Rhee push the Northern military
back across the border. Chinese “volunteers” camped on the edge of the Yalu River on the 
border  with North Korea moved into Korea to  fight  on the side of  the North.  The US  
imposed a total economic embargo on the PRC, an embargo that lasted more than twenty 
years. China’s aid program thus began in an ad hoc fashion in 1950 with the transfer of  
grain,  medicine,  cotton,  and other  industrial  materials  to  North Korea during the war.  
Support  for  socialist  countries  and  Marxist  independence  movements  marked  the  first  
years of China’s aid, but China also sent aid to most of the other countries on its long  
borders (including non-socialist Nepal)."
(Brautigam 2009: 29-30).
After  the Korean war,  in  1954, China’s  premier  Zhou Enlai  introduced the “Five Principles  of
Peaceful Coexistence” during negotiations with India over the Tibet issue. They consisted of: 
1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
2. Mutual non-aggression. 
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence. 
(Brautigam, 2009: 30)
Following  this,  Zhou  joined  Indonesian  President  Achmed  Sukarno,  Indian  Prime  Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and several dozen new African and
Asian  leaders  in  the  town  of  Bandung  in  Indonesia,  for  the  Afro-Asian  People’s  Solidarity
Conference, where they adopted the principles of peaceful coexistence as the foundation of the non-
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aligned movement,  the  countries  of  which  became known by the  monicer  "The Third  World."
(Brautigam, 2009: 30). 
In 2004, half a century after the late Premier Zhou Enlai's visits to India and Myanmar and the
issuing of  the  "Five Principles  of  Peaceful  Coexistence,"  Wen Jiabao,  the Premier  at  the time,
delivered a powerful speech on carrying forward the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in
the promotion of peace and development. He stated “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
have withstood the test of time, and made a monumental contribution to the maintenance of peace
and stability in Asia and the world over and the sound development of international relations” (Wen,
2004: 363). Continuing, he elaborates:
"First,  they  provide  a  set  of  right  guidelines  for  the  establishment  and development  of
relations among countries with similar or different social systems. Second, they point out an
effective way to peacefully address the issues left over by history between countries or other
international disputes. Third, they give a strong protection to the interests of developing
countries and serve the improvement and expansion of North-South relations. Fourth, they
have provided an important philosophical basis for the establishment of a new international
political and economic order that is just and rational."
(Wen, 2004: 363-364)
Wen points  out  that  China  has  been  a  faithful  practitioner  of  the  "Five  Principles  of  Peaceful
Coexistence," and basing its foreign policies on the Five Principles, China has been able to develop
diplomatic relations and carry out trade and cooperation with around 200 countries, maintain peace
with  most  of  its  neighbors,  and  provide  economic  and  technical  aid  with  no  political  strings
attached to many countries (Wen, 2004: 364). 
Particularly,  Wen  stresses  that  “since  the  beginning  of  the  reform and  opening  up,  China  has
improved and upgraded its mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries regardless of social
system and development level, and contributed its share to world peace and common development.
All this is inseparable from our firm, sincere and innovative adherence to the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence” (Wen, 2004: 364). As Wen claims, the principle of sovereign equality is “at
the  very heart  of  the  Five  Principles”  and only through genuinely observing the  principle  can
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mutually beneficial cooperation be conducted (ibid). 
To carry forward the Five Principles in the promotion of world peace and development, the Chinese
Government has stated that  it  is  ready to work with other  countries in five areas:  First,  firmly
upholding the principle of sovereign equality. Second, respecting and maintaining the diversity of
the world's civilizations. Third, promoting common development of the world's economies on the
basis of equality and mutual benefit. Fourth, maintaining peace and security through dialogue and
cooperation.  Fifth,  giving  full  scope  to  the  important  role  of  the  UN  and  other  multilateral
mechanisms. (Wen, 2004: 365-366)
In the end, Wen again emphasizes that “China will always put development on the top of its 
government's agenda” (Wen, 2004: 367). 
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Chapter 3: Method and Data
3.1 Data.
The data used in the analysis will be drawn from several sources. 
The first of these sources will be the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), software and data 
created in collaboration between the World Bank and International Trade Center, the United Nations
Statistical Division, and the World Trade Organization (WITS, 2014). This source includes data on 
Zambian exports and imports, trade balance, description of goods, as well as main trading partners. 
In addition, supplemental data to this will be drawn from the World Bank (2014) data itself.
The second source will be the “Human Development Report 2013. Rise of the South: Human 
Progress in a Diverse World” (HDR13) published by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). This is the latest instalment in a series of reports published annually by the UNDP, with 
the lead author of this issue being Khalid Malik. The report itself will provide data on child 
mortality rates with control variables, and the full data published alongside it will provide data on 
HDI and HDI change for both Zambia and Angola as well as a few other variables (HDR, 2014). 
In addition to the two above, there are five more sources used which are more country specific. For 
Angola these are: “The Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: The Case of Angola” by Ron 
Sandrey (2009) at the Trade Law Centre of Southern Africa, “Angola and China: A Pragmatic 
Relationship” by Indira Campos and Alex Vines (2007) at the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies (CSIS), and the European Commission (2014) data for trade with Angola. 
In the case of Zambia, there will be two additional data sources. The first being “Chinese Debt, Aid 
and Trade: Opportunity or Threat for Zambia?” by Chilufya Chileshe (2010) at the South African 
Institute of International Affairs, and the “Zambia Direction of Trade Report (Fourth Quarter 2009) 
by the Bank of Zambia (2010). 
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3.2 Reliability and validity of the data.
The reliability and validity of the datasets are important issues. First of all, the data itself must be 
trustworthy in order for the results of an analysis to be useful, and secondly, the data must be 
relevant to the question the analysis seeks to answer. Indeed, the thesis question itself, seeking to 
determine the validity and reliability of accusations levelled against Chinese involvement in Africa, 
it is especially important that the sources used to either confirm or discredit these are both reliable 
and valid. 
3.2.1 Reliability
When it comes to the reliability of the data, at first glance it might seem complicated as the data 
comes from a variety of sources. To begin with, however, there is the WITS database and HDR13. 
Both of these are from international reputable sources whose data is readily available for scrutiny. 
The remaining sources are all either peer-reviewed academic works, or from another reputable 
source, in the European Commission, and finally the Bank of Zambia. Naturally, this is no absolute 
guarantee of the reliability of the data, however, the potential of error should be within acceptable 
parameters. 
3.2.2 Validity
The validity of the data, and the potential for generalizations based on the findings is another 
important issue. Despite often being referred to as a single entity (including in some of the 
criticisms of Chinese involvement), sub-Saharan Africa is made up of a number of different 
countries. For instance, small and land-locked Lesotho is very different from the vast and war-torn 
Sudan. 
Ensuring validity is in some aspects made easier with the use of case studies. In these the researcher
can go in depth in a few countries to ensure important variables are not overlooked. An example of 
this is provided below, regarding Downs' arguments on Angola's dependency on the IMF for 
financing. 
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3.3 Case studies.
There are several ways in which to conduct case studies. This paper will utilize few-country 
comparisons. The strengths and weaknesses of few-country comparisons in particular will be 
discussed below. The reasons for selecting case studies in the first place are that, first of all, the data
available for each sub-Saharan country varies greatly, and often the data for the same variable must 
be drawn from separate sources. Secondly, when it comes to a study of sub-Saharan countries, the 
population of the study is relatively low, with approximately 50 countries depending on definition, 
and the amount of countries with significant Chinese presence is even lower. The third reason is that
case studies allows for a deeper understanding of particular countries which both complements the 
available theory on the subject in light of the thesis question, as well as providing the groundwork 
for later, more expansive studies where more countries can be compared to either support or refute 
the study. 
In this paper, there will be case studies of two countries: Angola and Zambia. There are several  
reasons for specifically selecting these two countries. The most important reason is that both 
countries have been stable politically over the last decade without wars or separatist struggles. Such 
an event would naturally deeply affect HDI numbers as well as abilities to carry out trade with not 
only China, but also other countries. The second reason is their populations. At 18.5 million for 
Angola and 14 million for Zambia, their economies are small enough to be affected significantly by 
larger foreign countries investing, but not so small as to be completely dominated by them. The 
third reason is that China is an important trade partner to both. 
The case studies will examine to which degree China is involved in these countries and how they 
are doing. HDI growth over a twelve year period (2000-2012) will be put into context with the 
world average, and it will be examined if these countries are better off. Naturally, the concept of 
“better” is quite subjective in and of itself, and a measure of to which degree the goals of aid 
organizations and other critics are being met something open to a degree of interpretation. The case 
studies will seek to lay a foundation for an argument as to whether or not the criticism is justified. 
In addition, the case studies will add a second layer to the examinations of the criticism against 
China. The first will be a comparison between criticism and academic theory, and the case studies 
will provide an additional data point with which to compare. 
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One issue to note is that some of the heaviest criticism toward Chinese involvement in Africa has 
been specified towards involvement in Zimbabwe and Sudan. However, the situation in these 
countries over the course of the last decade makes for unreliable data. Sudan has not only suffered a
devastating civil war, but has also split in two, and Zimbabwe has suffered bouts of hyperinflation 
to the point where the authorities have given up on having a national currency and the situation in 
the country means that foreign currencies such as the South African Rand and the U.S. Dollar are de
facto official currencies. 
3.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of comparing few countries.
One of the pitfalls of having case-studies with few countries is the potential of generalizing on 
erroneous grounds. Todd Landman (2000: 28) mentions a range of studies concerning the East 
Asian “tiger” economies which focused on a selected group of successful countries, ignoring some 
of the lesser successful ones, and thus reached the wrong conclusions as to why they experienced 
high economic growth rates. A problem with few-country comparisons is then selection bias 
(Landman, 2000: 81). However, due to the nature of the thesis question, this is somewhat mitigated.
If heavy Chinese investments do not show to have the severely negative consequences in, for 
instance, Angola, this indicates it is not the most significant independent variable for retarding 
progress in African countries. 
On the other hand, there are some compelling reasons for why to choose few-country comparisons. 
Foremost among these is the ability to gain a deeper knowledge of the countries chosen and gain an 
understanding of other independent variables. As an example, one can look back to Chapter 2, 
where Downs' article was presented. Under one of the myths presented about Sino-African energy 
relations, Downs argues that China's loans to Angola might have weakened the IMF's efforts to 
improve oil revenue transparency. In a high-N quantitative analysis with many independent 
variables this might be difficult to determine and examine, but Downs presents evidence that points 
to the Chinese unconditional loans not being the entire story. She argues that the combination of an 
increase in oil prices from $26 to $66 per barrel and an almost doubling of Angolan oil production 
in the period between 2001 and 2006 is also very relevant when looking at Angola's decision to not 
rely on the IMF. 
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Another reason for choosing few-country comparisons is that combined with the reason above, it 
provides a good starting point for thorough quantitative analyses of not just a selection, but the 
entire population, in this case consisting of some 40-50 countries, depending on the definition of the
term “sub-Saharan Africa.” 
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Argument
4.1 Matching the Criticisms with the Theory and the Data
In this chapter the criticisms levelled against China in chapter 2 will be contrasted with the theory
and the data. To begin with, the various aspects of the criticisms will be covered to see how they
match up with academic theory and quantitative data. 
Following this, case studies of Angola and Zambia will be brought forth to examine how these two
countries are developing. Finally, the main argument will be presented on whether or not, and to
which  extent  Chinese  involvement  can  be  argued  to  be  either  positive  or  negative  to  the
development  of  these  countries,  and what  these findings  may entail  for  further  examination of
development in sub-Saharan African countries. 
4.2 The Scope and Size of Chinese Involvement.
The extent to which China is involved in Africa is important to address before taking on the other
issues. David Blair (2007) claims that China's money flowing into the continent totalled more than
£30 billion in 2007, and that countries like Zimbabwe were flooded in cheap Chinese consumer
goods which drove local businesses to the ground. The latter will be examined later in this chapter,
in section 4.4, but the former needs to be verified and put into context. 
£30 billion is a rather large number, and as it is a newspaper article, Blair has not sourced this
amount, and neither has he elaborated on what this number includes. However, Chinese foreign
direct investment flows coming into Africa as a whole, not just sub-Saharan Africa, totalled just
under  $6.5  billion  in  2006  according  to  the  China  Investment  Tracker  (Brautigam,  2014),
amounting to only 3 percent of total Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (Poncet, 2009: 26).
While substantially lower than Blair's, these numbers are also somewhat artificially inflated as they
include funds allocated to Africa whether or not the projects they are meant to finance have begun
or the money having been transferred. 
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Looking  at  the  actual  inflow  of  money  to  Africa  from  China,  one  finds  that  in  2005,  the
accumulated value of this stood at $1.6 billion (Poncet, 2009: 26). Which, with current exchange
rates between the dollar and the pound, would make it approximately one thirtieth of Blair's claim. 
It is possible, of course, that Blair uses numbers that simply add up everything that looks Chinese;
FDI, tourism, revenue earned by Chinese companies in Africa, etc.  However, this implies a line of
reasoning akin to one of the myths presented by Downs: "China's oil companies' African activities
reflect a highly coordinated government strategy" (Downs, 2007: 48). And, as Downs demonstrated,
this is simply not the case. Chinese companies often complain of poor coordination from the central
authorities,  and  in  the  other  direction,  the  central  authorities  in  Beijing  often  bemoan  the
companies', in which they are major shareholders, lack of ability to cooperate. One of the examples
Downs mentions is two Chinese oil companies undercutting each other for contracts, leading to
lower profits for the winner of the bid, despite the Chinese government holding a controlling share
in both companies (Downs, 2007: 48-50). 
Moving beyond FDI, one can see that African exports to Asia have increased dramatically in the
recent decades. 
 Fig. 4.1. (Source: Broadman, 2007)
From 1990 to 2005, the share of African exports to Asia has increased from 9 percent to almost 28
percent (Fig. 4.1). China alone accounts for 40 percent of the exports to Asia (Broadman, 2007). Of
these exports, though, on a global basis only about 20 percent of African exports are manufactured
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goods, and the case with Asia and China is no different; in fact 86 percent of African exports to Asia
are  commodities,  while  80 percent  of  African imports  from Asia  as  a  whole  are  manufactured
goods, compared to 87 percent from China (ibid.). In dollar terms, this equates to over $10 billion in
African imports from China by 2005. 
An important reason for this trade disparity is the high tariffs African countries face when it comes
to exporting manufactured products to Asian countries compared to the low tariffs on raw materials,
but Broadman (2007) also points out that this is not always the entire story. One example he brings
up is cocoa exports to China. Despite Chinese tariffs on finished chocolate products being only
slightly higher than on unprocessed cocoa beans (9 percent on the former compared to 8 percent on
the latter), African producers are struggling to break into the Chinese chocolate market due to a
limited capacity to produce high quality products, something which has led to increasing exports of
cocoa beans and declining exports of cocoa powder and chocolate to China (Broadman, 2007). 
The Chinese presence in sub-Saharan Africa is also felt in other ways. Angolan newspaper Visao
(2012) reports that there are now more than 250,000 Chinese residents in Angola, mainly in the
capital  of Luanda. For the other country in particular interest  to this  paper,  China accounts for
almost 17 percent of Zambia's exports and 10 percent of its imports, making it Zambia's second
most important export partner and third most important import partner (WITS, 2014). 
4.3 The Human Rights Issue.
When dealing with human rights violations in developing countries, a method that is often utilized
and argued for is to “punish” the country by cutting development aid, or other measures of using the
stick over the carrot. A recent example is the reactions of several Western countries to Uganda's
newly implemented anti-homosexuality laws. Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Børge Brende,
notified Norwegian media that he would cut 12 percent of Norwegian development aid to Uganda
as a result of the law, and his Danish and Swedish colleagues were reported to consider similar
sanctions (Carlsen and Bjørgaas, 2014). The spokesperson for matters of foreign affairs for the
Norwegian Progress Party, coalition members in Brende's government, argued in favour of cutting
all  aid  to  Uganda  as  “such  an  unacceptable  law should  prevent  any support  from Norwegian
taxpayers” (ibid.). 
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The move to curtail aid was criticized by senior researcher Morten Bøås at the Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs (NUPI), as counter-effective for the situation of homosexuals in Uganda
(Olsson, 2014). He argues that, first of all, this may unite the proponents of the law against foreign
intervention, second, that Ugandans generally support the law, and third, that Uganda is less reliant
on Western aid as it can acquire loans from both Russia and China instead (ibid.). 
However, this is an example of the ingrained reflex of how to deal with undesirable regimes and
policies in African countries. The question with which this paper concerns itself is whether or not
this achieves its desired outcomes. In the case of Uganda in this instance, the law being repealed. 
Going back, then, to the criticism levelled against China, one recalls that among them was the issue
of human rights and in  particular the Chinese involvement with the Omar al-Bashar regime in
Sudan during the Darfur atrocities. To begin with, one of the more specific allegations against China
for their involvement with human rights violations came from David Blair's article. To reiterate, in
it, he writes:
“Thanks to Beijing's interest in Sudan's oil, President Omar al-Bashir's regime in Khartoum
has received a windfall.  Ten years ago, Sudan's oil  revenues were negligible;  last year,  
Chinese investment ensured that they totalled at least £3 billion. Without this ready cash, Mr
Bashir could never have sustained the war in Darfur, where four years of fighting have 
claimed  about  300,000  lives,  either  from violence,  starvation  or  disease.  The  military  
machine that has laid waste to vast tracts of land, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee their
homes, was, in effect, bankrolled by Beijing. Moreover, China has sold weapons directly to 
Sudan, notably Fantan ground attack aircraft."
(Blair, 2007). 
In essence, what Blair argues is that China is directly responsible for the atrocities in Darfur, due to
their uncritical funding of the Khartoum regime. In a way this can be seen as the natural next step
from  the  situation  in  Uganda  from  the  example  above:  Developing  country  does  something
undesirable, Western countries sanction by cutting support, China steps in to replace the support,
China is sustains the developing country's ability to perform undesirable acts. 
Returning to Sudan, however, the case is not always as clear as that. In chapter 2 Erica Downs'
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article on Sino-African energy relations was reviewed, and among the myths she sought to refute or
clarify was the one that “Chinese oil investments in Sudan undermine international efforts to end
the Darfur crisis" (Downs, 2007: 58). 
In her article, Downs does concede that China's role in Sudan during the Darfur atrocities was not
initially particularly helpful to the reaching of a resolution to the conflict, but Beijing's change in
attitude towards the Khartoum regime is important to note. She particularly points to U.S. Special
Envoy for Sudan, Andrew Natsios, who: 
“(...)  complimented  China's  subtle  behind-the-scenes  diplomacy  toward  Sudan  as  a  
useful complement to the blunt, highly-visible approach taken by the United States. His  
remarks echo those made in private conversations by Chinese foreign policy officials and  
analysts  who  maintain  that  the  United  States,  which  usually  plays  the  “bad  cop,”  
needs China to assume the role of “good cop” for progress to be made in negotiations with
countries such as Sudan, Iran and North Korea.”
(Downs, 2007: 61). 
This is clearly at odds with Blair's claims that China is to a great extent responsible for the Darfur
atrocities  by funding Khartoum. In her  article,  Downs continues to  explain this  by pointing to
China's  increased leverage over Khartoum compared to the countries which had already placed
sanctions  on  the  regime,  as  well  as  Beijing's  easier  access  to  high-level  diplomatic  channels,
through which they could convey their concerns over the Darfur situation. Additionally, there is the
point  Downs also briefly touches  upon;  China's  relations  to  other  African  countries.  The other
countries with which China seeks to maintain a profitable relationship with in sub-Saharan Africa
were very concerned with the Situation in Darfur (Downs, 2007: 60). While Downs (2007: 61) also
argues that there is a widespread perception in Beijing that situations like the one in Darfur are
primarily rooted in poverty, and sanctions are the counter-productive, the previous point removes
the necessity to determine Beijing's determination to morality; allowing the situation in Darfur to
deteriorate would be bad for business for Chinese companies looking for contracts in other African
countries, and thus bad for business for Beijing. 
Also  in  her  article  Downs  points  to  criticisms  of  China,  especially  in  the  run-up to  the  2008
Olympic Games in Beijing, as a catalyst for Chinese authorities to more actively seek to improve its
reputation abroad. This is very interesting in the context of this paper as it indicates a meta-quality
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to the criticisms China is facing, in that they themselves aid in correcting China's actions. It is
indeed a complex issue, where many factors play a part in Beijing's decision-making process, but
there is another important point to consider in direct relation to China receiving the criticism over
foreign involvement with a regime involved in actions such as in Darfur. Specifically, the fact that
while China was being criticized for funding Khartoum, the French oil company Total was allowed
to maintain its non-producing Block B in the Southern oil fields, in the middle of the area in which
the hostilities took place, throughout the situation, paying Khartoum $1.5 per year for upkeep of its
licence (Downs, 2007: 62). 
When it comes to Sudan's oil revenue, though, Blair does have a point. It has increased drastically
with Chinese involvement, from zero barrels exported in 1998 to approximately 375,000 barrels of
crude per day in 2007, which, with an average annual price per barrel of $72.44, accounts to close
to  $10  billion  in  oil  revenues  for  that  year  (U.S.  Energy  Information  Administration,  2014).
However, it is highly questionable that the notion of impoverishing a country to curtail its capability
to wage war in any ways improve a tense situation, as is the argument by Beijing as mentioned
above. With no effective government to speak of, and one of the world's lowest gross domestic
products per capita, Sudan's neighbour Somalia is a rather convincing argument against just that. 
4.4 The Poverty Issue.
In addition to human rights, China has also been criticized for retarding economic growth in African
countries  by  importing  raw  materials  and  returning  with  manufactured  goods,  creating  a  self-
perpetuating situation where developing countries are losing their natural resources and are unable
to establish a functioning entrepreneurial economy due to cheap imported goods from China. Jane
Goodall states that "[in] Africa, China is merely doing what the colonialists did. They want raw
materials for their economic growth, just as the colonialists were going into Africa and taking the
natural resources, leaving people poorer" (Rawstory, 2014).
Blair (2007), in his article, echoes this as he claims that the influx of Chinese goods and products on
the African market have not assisted the economy, rather, he argues, Zimbabweans refer to them
condescendingly as "zing zong" products, which has a tendency to break apart in one's hands, and
that  the employment  opportunities  provided by Chinese copper  mines  in  Zambia  are  based  on
exploitation  of  local  labour  with  a  disregard  for  basic  health  and  safety  standards,  while
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simultaneously driving local companies out of business by flooding the market in cheap Chinese
imports.
To address this, one must first look at the numbers for Chinese imports in Zimbabwe. In the year of
Blair's article, 2007, Chinese imports in Zimbabwe totalled $215 million, or 6.3 percent of total
imports in the country, and about $19 million, or approximately 9 percent of Chinese imports, of
that was classified as consumer goods (WITS, 2014). For a country of approximately 13 million
people,  $19  million  worth  of  consumer  goods  can  hardly  be  called  flooding  the  market.
Furthermore, as the numbers show, the consumer goods account for only a small percentage of
Chinese imports to Zimbabwe. 
Looking at Africa as a whole, in 2004, African imports of Chinese products reached $11 billion. 87
percent  of  these were manufactured goods,  mainly textiles  and apparel,  electric  machinery and
equipment, and such consumer products as medicine, cosmetics, and batteries (Broadman, 2007). In
return, African countries' exports to China reached $15 billion in 2004, up from about $6 billion in
2000, of which 62 percent were oil and gas, 17 percent ore and metals, and 7 percent agricultural
raw materials (ibid.). Despite the positive trade balance in pure numbers, it is clear that China is the
one profiting the most from this, by being able to boost its own industry both by the supply of the
necessary raw materials as well as an export market. 
“Africa's exports to Asia have not yet significantly contributed to sustained, widespread  
[sub-Saharan  African]  export  diversification,  of  either  trading  partners  or  products,  
including with respect to greater value added through further processing. Even though the 
boom in  natural  resource  exports  to  China and India  is  providing short-term benefits,  
African  countries  need  strategies  to  leverage  the  current  export  explosion  to  create  
opportunities for long-term economic benefits.”
(Broadman, 2007). 
Another issue related to poverty is dependency ratios in poor countries. The dependency ratio is the
ratio between those in a country who are in the labour force and those who are not. This ratio is an
increasingly critical concern, with a high dependency ratio leading to impoverishment of a country
and reversals of human development (UNDP, 2013: 97). The most important policies to affect the
dependency ratio in a desirable direction is education and labour policies (UNDP, 2013: 98-99). In
other words, increasing amount of education for a larger percentage of the population and ensuring
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higher labour participation rates. Especially for the latter, foreign investment is important. 
Another  criticism from Goodall  was the  Chinese lack  of  concern  for  the  environment  in  their
involvement in Africa. This is particularly relevant to poverty related issues as the United Nations
Development Programme estimates for extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily affected
by environmental issues. Their projections for people in the region living in extreme poverty (i.e.,
less  than  two dollars  per  day)  in  2050 range  from a  best  case  scenario  of  230  million  to  an
environmental disaster scenario of above one billion (see Fig. 4.2). 
Fig. 4.2 (Source: UNDP, 2013: 96)
This is a case where the criticism is largely justified. China is a major consumer of non-renewable
energy sources. With a current consumption of over 4 billion tonnes of coal annually and over
10,000 barrels per day of oil, China is now the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, releasing
just under 9,000 tonnes into the atmosphere annually (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2014). Considering then that the majority of what China imports from Africa is oil, both the cause
and effect of global warming is highly relevant to sub-Saharan African countries. The latter is due to
climate change disproportionately having an adverse effect on poor countries and poor communities
(UNDP,  2013:  95).  One  of  the  reasons  for  this  is  that  as  environmental  and  natural  disasters
increase, the brunt of these is much harder to bear for poorer countries as their effects can incur
losses significantly affecting the GDP of the country in question. In the HDR13, it is pointed out
that in some cases this can amount to between one and eight percent of a country's GDP, and as a
particularly striking example, the hurricane Gilbert caused damages to St. Lucia totalling more than
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four times its GDP when it struck in 1988 (UNDP, 2013: 95). 
However, when looking at Chinese emission rates compared to Western countries, it is clear that
despite being the world's biggest single emitter, China's per capita emissions are about one half of
Germany's and one third of the U.S. numbers (see Fig. 4.3). This, of course, does not absolve China
of responsibility regarding its increasing emissions, but it does put the numbers in perspective and
shows that simply blaming only China is unfair.
Country Total CO2 emissions (million 
metric tonnes)
CO2 emissions per capita 
(metric tonnes)
China 8715.31 5.451
USA 5490.63 17.266
Germany 748.49 9.275
Fig. 4.3 (Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). 
Another note to be aware of, is that Zambia, one of the countries featured in the case studies below,
does not export most of its raw materials for the manufacturing industry to China. Zambia's largest
export partner is Switzerland, to which it exports three times as much as to China, and almost all of
this consists of ore and metals (WITS, 2014). This shows that China is not the only actor in the
African export market, looking to secure raw materials for its own manufacturing industry. 
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4.5 Case studies: Zambia and Angola.
4.5.1 Angola.
Angola  is  a  geographically large country in  South Western Africa,  roughly the size  of  France,
Germany and  the  Benelux  countries  combined,  with  approximately 18.5  million  inhabitants,  5
million of which live in the capital of Luanda. Angola gained independence from its colonial power
Portugal in 1975 after a protracted armed struggle for independence, which was followed by a civil
war  that  lasted  until  2002.  Since  then  Angola  has  remained  politically  relatively  stable,  with
elections held successfully in 2008 and 2012.
When looking at  well-being and desirable  changes in  a  country,  a  useful  metric  for  measuring
development is the Human Development Index (HDI). Used by the United Nations Development
Programme, this index uses composite measures of life expectancy, education, and income indices
to measure development  in  a  country on a  scale  from 0 to 1,  where 1 is  the best.  Looking at
Angola's  scores,  one  can  see  that  the  country had an  HDI score  of  0.375 in  2000 which  had
increased  to  0.508  in  2012,  amounting  to  a  total  increase  over  that  period  of  35  percent.  In
comparison, the world average in 2000 was 0.639 and in 2012 it had increased to 0.694, for a total
increase of 8 percent (UNDP, 2014). This puts Angola at 148th of 187 countries measured. 
This does put Angola at the lower end of the spectrum of human development, but with a recent
history mired in armed struggle and strife, and such rapid improvement over the last decade, the
indications are positive, and with a continued growth, Angola is on the track to catch up with the
world average. 
One of the variables on which the HDI score is calculated is the child mortality rate. This is an area
in which Angola has not been excelling. In 2012, the child mortality rate (i.e., under-5 deaths per
1,000  live  births)  stood  at  163.5,  well  above  the  world  average  of  47.8  (World  Bank,  2014).
Furthermore,  with  a  life  expectancy at  birth  of  51.5  years,  Angola  has  one  of  the  lowest  life
expectancies in the world (UNDP, 2014). 
The one area where Angola does score highly,  however,  is its gross national income (GNI). At
$4,812 ( constant 2005 international $) this is relatively high for a sub-Saharan country (UNDP,
2014).  As for GDP growth, Angola enjoyed extremely high rates of growth prior to the global
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financial crisis in 2008, in 2007 at above 20 percent growth, and despite being significantly affected
by the global decline in available credit, it is back on an upward trajectory (see Fig. 4.4). 
Fig 4.4 (Source: World Bank, 2014).
However,  as  mentioned  above,  a  country's  dependency  ratio  is  important  to  consider.  The
dependency ratio in Angola in 2012 was 100 compared to world average of 53.7 (World Bank,
2014). This is the result of a high fertility rate common to underdeveloped countries with a high
child mortality rate and low life expectancy. 
When it comes to the level of Chinese involvement in Angola, the Angolan newspaper Visao (2007)
reports that the amount of Chinese residents in the country had passed 250,000, which makes a
significant group in a country with 18.5 million inhabitants. Furthermore, as both Downs (2007)
and Brautigam (2009) points out, Angola has received large commodity-backed loans from China
Eximbank, totalling over $12 billion. 
4.5.2 Zambia.
As a  British  possession,  the  landlocked  Northern  Rhodesia,  named after  the  explorer  Cecil  B.
Rhodes, was mainly ruled through London by proxy for the British South Africa Company. Gaining
its independence in 1964, the newly fledged state of Zambia remained a single-party state until
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1991.  
With a significantly lower GNI  than Angola, at $1,350 per capita in 2012 (World Bank, 2014),
Zambia's GDP growth has not been quite as remarkably high as that of Angola. However, it did not
suffer from the global financial crisis in 2008 and has kept increasing (see Fig. 4.5). 
Fig 4.5 (Source: World Bank, 2014). 
Looking at Zambia's HDI numbers, in 2000 the country had a score of 0.376. In 2012 this had
increased to 0.448, amounting to a total increase of 19 percent (UNDP, 2014). As mentioned above,
this is compared to a world average increase of 8 percent, and a world average in 2012 of 0.694. 
To an even greater extent than Angola, this shows that Zambia's HDI value is below the world
average, placing Zambia at 163rd of 187 countries measured (UNDP, 2014). Obviously, this is rather
low, and it is a very limited range of positives connected to it, but the situation is improving, and in
Zambia the situation is improving at twice the pace of the world average.
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
Country Year No education Primary Secondary  or
higher
Overall
Zambia 2004 144 146 105 137
World 2004 n/a n/a n/a 65
Fig. 4.6 (Sources: UNDP, 2013: 89, and World Bank, 2014)
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In some areas the improvements in Zambia's scores are remarkable. One in particular is the child
mortality rate. Fig 4.6 shows the situation in 2004, with the child mortality rate in Zambia overall
being more than twice as high as the world average. However, if one looks at the progress from
2004 to 2012, one can see that Zambia is approaching the world average (see Fig. 4.7) and in 2012
is at 88.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared to the 2012 world average of 47.8. 
This shows that while Zambia's HDI growth has not been as impressive as that of Angola, although
still above the world average, in certain metrics Zambia far outperforms Angola. 
Fig 4.7 (Source: World Bank, 2014)
Another metric related to this is fertility rates. In 2007, the fertility rates of Zambia stood at an
overall value of 6.2 live births per woman. For those women with no education, the number was
even higher with 8.2 live births per woman. 
Total fertility rate (births per woman)
Country Survey year No education Primary Secondary or 
higher
Overall
Zambia 2007 8.2 7.1 3.9 6.2
Fig 4.8 (Source: UNDP 2013: 89)
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The fertility rates in Zambia are connected to the country's dependency ratio. IN 2012, Zambia’s
dependency ratio was 97,  compared to world average of 53.7 (World Bank, 2014). As with Angola,
this is a very high number which highlights the precarious in which Zambia finds itself with regards
to its continued HDI growth. (UNDP, 2013: 97)  
In the section on the poverty issue above, the skewed trade balance between African countries and
China was highlighted,  with China mainly exporting manufactured goods to Africa,  and Africa
exporting raw materials to China. For Zambia, this is also the case, with mainly raw materials going
to  China,  and manufactured  goods coming in  return.  However,  as  mentioned above,  it's  worth
noting that Zambia's main export partner, Switzerland, imports three times as much from Zambia as
does China, and of these, ore and metals account for almost all (WITS, 2014). 
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4.6 Is China's Involvement Beneficial to African Countries?
As seen, first in Chapter 2, and then above, the criticisms toward Chinese involvement in Africa
revolve around three issues.  Human rights,  economy and poverty,  and the environment.  In  the
following section the argument that the first two of these criticisms are exaggerated and to a large
degree unwarranted will be presented. 
To begin with is the issue of human rights. Specifically, that Chinese dealings with regimes which
violate human rights allow these violations to continue. With these criticisms there are two main
aspects  to  consider.  The  first  is  the  misrepresentation  of  how  much  financing  China  actually
contributes to African regimes, and the second is whether or not this actually sustains human rights
violations. 
As for the size and scope of Chinese investments in African countries as a whole, Blair used the
number £30 billion pounds. However, as the data from Brautigam (2014) and Poncet (2009) above
shows, the real number for Chinese investments in Africa is substantially lower. 
As was shown in Chapter 2, Brautigam pointed to a mistake in an Associated Press story, quoting a
World  Bank report,  saying China’s  premier  admitting  China  had given Africa  “more  than  $44
billion in aid” since the beginning of its aid program; but what China’s premier actually said was
RMB 44 billion ($5.7 billion) (Brautigam, 2009: 177). Naturally, when mistakes such as this are
allowed to  permeate  the  debate,  China's  role  and responsibility in  places  such as  Sudan looks
different to what it might actually be. 
Furthermore, on the question of whether or not these capital inflows lead to increased levels of
corruption, which in turn further sustains an authoritarian regime's grip on power, one must again
look back to Chapter 2 and Brautigam's arguments on how Chinese investments are actually carried
out. She argues that first China’s engagement with Africa has not significantly changed the playing
field (Brautigam, 2009: 284). 
“China’s rise has clearly given dictators additional financing options, but finance from China differs
little from the other options readily open to most African dictators” (Brautigam, 2009: 285). Among
these other sources are  Western banks,  such as BNP Paribas which is  currently embroiled in a
scandal revolving around financing Iran, Sudan and Cuba by circumventing sanctions placed on
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those countries, as well as other countries such as Russia and Saudi-Arabia. 
In addition to this, as Brautigam pointed out, political conditions attached by other donors have not
succeeded in improving human rights and democracy in Africa either. As an example, one could
look to the homosexuality issue in  Uganda mentioned earlier  in  this  chapter,  where strict  anti-
homosexuality  laws  have  been  implemented  despite  Uganda  having  been  a  development  aid
recipient from Western countries, as well as despite said Western countries' protests at the law. 
With regards to Sudan, specifically, there is also the point Brautigam brings up, and Downs (2007)
expands upon; China's behaviour is evolving. While its initial relations with Khartoum left a lot to
be desired from the vantage point of seeking to end the hostilities in Darfur, Downs shows that
Beijing has not only increased its pressure on Khartoum, but has also used its leverage, as an active
business partner, to force president al-Bashar to the negotiations table. To late for both Downs'
article and Brautigam's book to take into account, this has led to the formation of a new state, South
Sudan, and the cessation of major hostilities. 
Moving on to corruption, as shown through Brautigam's (2009: 293-294) explanation, the way in
which Chinese financial involvement manifests itself in Africa leaves significantly less room for
corruption compared to the “cheques with conditions” issued by Western donors. China Eximbank
loans are not usually disbursed to the borrowing government in weak states. This aids in reducing
corruption by keeping the money in China and using escrow accounts filled by receipts from natural
resource exports as guarantees, meaning there is also “less opportunity for the kind of wholesale
embezzlement sadly common in some resource-rich countries” (ibid.). 
Another  concern,  the  potential  for  “padding  of  expenses,  sweetheart  deals,  collusion  and  bid-
rigging, and kickbacks,” as Brautigam refers to it,  is still,  however, a genuine issue. Brautigam
reports that China is showing mixed messages with regards to this, with weak laws on the subject
and a poor domestic record on the issue. Despite, then, the positive corruption curbing effects of the
general practice, there are still major issues with regards to corruption of Chinese funds that need to
be addressed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Corruption, being thus related to human rights, is also the link between the human rights issue and
the poverty issue as the first,  and main, two points of criticism against Chinese involvement in
Africa.  In  other  words,  is  the  Chinese  money  going  into  Africa  beneficial  or  detrimental  to
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Africans?  Among others,  in  Chapter  2,  Jane  Goodall's  claims  that  Chinese  involvement  leaves
Africans poorer was put forth. 
Another critic of Chinese investments in Africa, was Zhou (2006) who argued that these paid off
handsomely for China,  pointing to how 30 percent of China's  crude oil  imports  originate from
Africa, and that this trade relationship is turning towards a balance heavily favouring China, which
receives raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods. The scope of this, Zhou claimed, will
have passed $50 billion in the year of his article. He continues to state that this relationship will
ensure that the African countries, as a result of it, will remain weak economies. 
These criticisms, however, that Chinese investments propagate poverty in Africa, are directly at
odds with the economic development theories for which Gärtner and Easterly argued in Chapter 2.
Indeed, on the contrary, they argued that massive investments are the only methods by which poor
countries  can  escape  the  poverty  trap,  and  that  traditional  Western  aid,  while  occasionally
temporarily  helpful  to  the  local  population,  do  not  solve  the  problem  of  slow  economic
development, and an over-reliance on these methods is, in fact, what keeps African countries poor. 
From the economic theories and the empirical data on which they rest, and that which has been put
forth in this paper, it is clear that economically Chinese involvement in Africa is beneficial to the
African countries. Despite Angola having experienced a setback in growth rates as a result of the
global financial crisis, the growth rates it has experienced over the last decade have been nothing
short of phenomenal. Both Angola and Zambia have experienced growth rates much higher than the
world average, which combined with relative improvements in other metrics, such as Zambia's child
mortality rate, show that both of these countries are heading in the right direction. 
In  addition  to  the  economic  development  theories,  it  is  also  important  to  take  into  account
Brautigam's description of China's perception of its relationship with other developing countries.
She points to Beijing's “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” ensuring equality, mutual benefit,
stress on practical results, diversity in form, and common progress (Brautigam, 2009: 53). 
Furthermore, Brautigam argues that the Chinese government helps Chinese enterprises to invest in
Africa by providing lower-cost loans to companies, launching the China-Africa Development Fund
to support investment, setting up overseas zones to reduce risks and uncertainty, etc. This is an
important  cornerstone  in  achieving  the  push  out  of  the  poverty  trap,  by ensuring  growth,  and
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providing a demand for educated and skilled labourers,  which in  turn leads to  a higher  skilled
labour  force,  which  again  is  the  key to  economic  progress  in  countries  where  the  population
otherwise would be too preoccupied with basic sustenance needs. In comparison, many U.S. and
European manufacturers have “shied away from investing in African factories” and official support
lacks in these countries (Brautigam, 2009: 92).  Again,  without  these investments from Western
countries, sustainable economic growth to escape the poverty trap cannot be achieved. 
Furthermore, as China is criticized of labour-law violations and exploitation of the local labour
force, it is interesting that the idea of Western investments of the same kind as China is carrying out
are not considered, as these investments would increase the demand for workers and thus shift the
power balance between workers and management, leading to an improvement in the labour situation
for local workers while still remaining within the market. That is, it would improve the situation
without relying on morals and ethic standards to hold sway over a drive for profit. 
However, this does not mean that China should be uncritically lauded for its efforts in Africa. The
third aspect of criticisms against its involvement, that of environmental concerns, is still an issue.
Environmental degradation is a global problem, but it primarily has negative consequences for poor
countries. Mentioned earlier was the significant impact this can have on a poor country's budget,
and in  the case of  sub-Saharan  Africa  the geographic  location  also adds to  this  by an  already
vulnerable climate and the danger of desertification of previously arable land. 
With China now standing as the world's largest emitter of CO2, it holds an additional responsibility
beyond its industrial and petroleum-related investments in African countries. As was noted above,
the Chinese per capita emissions are still significantly lower than those of Western countries, but
this does not change the fact that China is still the biggest emitter, and climate change depends on
total emissions, not who emits what. 
Brautigam (2009: 303) notes that “China has been on a steep learning curve on environmental
issues  and  corporate  social  responsibility  –  part  of  President  Hu  Jintao’s  pledge  to  build  a
‘harmonious society.’” While still lagging behind on the concept of corporate social responsibility,
China can be seen to be making steps to evolve its position also on these issues. As a growing
middle class in the Eastern Chinese cities is experiencing first hand the problems with pollution,
leading to national debates on the issue, providing incentives for environmentalism for a regime
which  needs  legitimacy  to  continue  its  rule,  Brautigam  also  reports  that  Chinese  banks  and
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ministries have shown eagerness to get relevant training on social and environmental principles,
showing that this new concept of corporate social responsibility is gaining traction also in Beijing. 
Nevertheless,  in  sub-Saharan Africa the reality on the ground is  still  that  foreign countries are
importing  their  raw materials  while  returning  with  manufactured  products.  While  the  evidence
posted above is  a strong indicator  that  this  increased foreign investment  is  the main cause for
escaping the poverty trap, it is by no means certain. An unfortunate scenario for sub-Saharan Africa
is that foreign investment in the region remains contained to raw materials, without the countries in
question being able to diversify their economies before the resources run out, dooming them to a
prolonged future in poverty. 
However, it is this very fact that makes it imperative for other, mainly Western, countries to increase
their investments in the region, not only to check the Chinese involvement, but also to provide
competition for contracts and labour, and thus shifting the power balance back in favour of the host
countries. 
The results of the economic development theories, the evidence, and the situation in sub-Saharan
Africa, are the ramifications this has on how to view development aid. 
In the introduction it was mentioned how the concept of aid is often viewed. The proverbial man on
the street would likely associate the term with providing mosquito nets, vaccines, emergency health
care, food, etc. He might draw connotations to bags of rice stamped with U.S. Aid, or to a field
clinic set up by Doctors Without Borders, or UNICEF digging wells for small villages, or the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation vaccinating children and providing mosquito nets to poor areas where
the housing quality is too low to keep the insects and the malaria out at night.
All these pursuits are noble in their aim, and for the time being they are necessary to provide an
improved situation to those currently living in unacceptable conditions. On the micro level, this
form of aid is often, quite literally, the difference between life and death, and in the case of small
infrastructure projects the difference that gives small villages the opportunity to develop out of the
most extreme poverty.
However,  it  should be the goal of development aid and programmes to make these endeavours
superfluous.  Truly,  a better  world is  not one where in which millions are lifted out of extreme
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poverty to mere poverty, but rather one in which there is no poverty at all. 
It  is  for this  reason that  Chinese involvement  in  sub-Saharan African countries  receives  unjust
amounts of criticism. Although saving a child from malaria is important, it is much more important
to save that child's country from the poverty trap, so that in the future the citizens of that country are
no longer in need of the most basic assistance. 
This paper argues that development aid to sub-Saharan African countries needs to be fundamentally
reconsidered and brought more in line with the Chinese approach on the subject. 
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Chapter 5: Summary, conclusions, 
and further research. 
5.1 Summary.
This paper began with the question of whether or not Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan African
countries is of benefit or detriment to the countries in question. The context in which this question
was posed is was one where China has been receiving harsh criticisms for its involvement in these
countries. In the second chapter these criticisms were examined, and it was shown that they revolve
around three main issues; the human rights issue, the poverty issue, and the environmental issue.
Furthermore, the second chapter also illuminated the Chinese perspective on political as well as
economic development, in addition to examining current economic development theories, provided
by Gärtner and Easterly. Finally, the chapter devoted much space to Erica Downs and Deborah
Brautigam,  two  of  the  leading  academic  authorities  on  African  development  and  Sino-African
relations. 
The method used in this  paper to answer the thesis  question has been largely qualitative.  Data
collected from various sources has been used to address and contextualize the criticisms, and have
provided the basis for case studies of two sub-Saharan African countries; Angola and Zambia. The
case studies showed that both countries have experienced rapid growth in both HDI and GDP over
the last decade, well above the world average, during which they have also experienced large-scale
Chinese investments. 
The three criticisms were addressed in Chapter 4, where it was shown that they to a great extent
unfairly portrays Chinese involvement in Africa in a negative light. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 it
was argued that in light of economic development theory, Chinese involvement is beneficial to sub-
Saharan African countries, as it provides the necessary financial boost to escape the poverty trap.
However, it was also pointed out that the issues regarding Chinese involvement in Africa are not
black and white.  Especially regarding corruption and environmental concerns,  China is  lagging
behind, despite also showing signs of improvement. 
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5.2 Conclusion.
The evidence brought forth in this paper shows that a great deal of the criticism China receives is
largely unjustified. However, the issues cannot be viewed as binary code. Chinese involvement in
Africa is not either wholly good or wholly bad. With regards to human rights, the case of Sudan and
the  Darfur  atrocities  is  an  example  of  this.  China  received  a  great  deal  of  criticism  over  its
involvement with the Khartoum regime and indeed there were aspects of this  that were rightly
criticized, such as Chinese arms sales to Sudan during the civil war, and Beijing's initial refusal to
act against the al-Bashar regime during its massacres of civilians. However, it must also be noted
that  Beijing did  evolve its  position on Sudan,  and by using its  leverage,  a  leverage that  other
countries did not possess as they had already imposed sanctions, China received praise from the
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan for complementing the U.S. and other Western nations in pursuing a
peaceful resolution to the conflict. And in the end, with the establishment of the new country of
South Sudan, the situation is not yet perfect, and the humanitarian situation in the region is still
precarious, but major hostilities have ended. 
On poverty in developing countries, China was accused of being the modern-day equivalent to the
colonialist powers of the 19th century, robbing the African continent of its raw materials to fuel its
own growing industry and leaving nothing but poverty and despair in its wake. However, reality,
with empirical evidence combined with the economic development theory, does not reflect these
criticisms. China is mostly importing raw materials from Africa and exporting manufactured goods
in return, so there is the danger of this being a hindrance to the necessary diversification of the
economy for the sub-Saharan African countries to which it applies. In this sense, criticisms against
Chinese involvement in Africa are partially valid. 
Still, this paper has argued that a greater danger to the economies of sub-Saharan African countries
is the lack of investments from Western countries to match those of China. The reason for this is
two-fold.  First,  an  increased  Western  industrial  presence  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  would  provide
increased competition to Chinese firms, leading to improvements in labour issues and providing
more power to the host countries. The petroleum industry is an example of a sector where this is
already happening, but from the other direction. Downs pointed to Chinese national oil companies
which,  competing  with  established  Western  oil  companies  with  higher  capabilities  and
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competencies,  were  forced  to  offer  more  lucrative  deals  including  non-petroleum  related
investments for sub-Saharan African countries eager to diversify their economies in order to win
contracts  for  projects.  Thus,  increased  competition  in  other  sectors  will  also  aid  economic
diversification and help shift the power balance in favour of the Africans. 
Second, increased investments would aid sub-Saharan African countries in escaping poverty trap.
The economic development theories show that massive investments are needed to push a country
out of the poverty trap. This because increase demand would lead to higher education rates, higher
economic  growth,  and  more  employment  opportunities.  Furthermore,  as  seen  by  the  effect  a
mother's  education has on child mortality rates  in Zambia,  this  would also have an immediate
humanitarian gain, with decreased child mortality, which in turn pushes down the fertility rates,
which yet in turn addresses the precariously high dependency rates. 
The case study of Angola showed that it is a country with indications of both positive and negative
developments. For the former, Angola shows remarkable growth in GDP and HDI, by far outpacing
the rate of the world average. For the latter, Angola is still struggling with a high child mortality rate
and a low life-expectancy, and despite the impressive growth numbers, Angola's HDI ranking is
close to the bottom. 
In the case of Zambia, the case study showed similar traits to that of Angola. GDP and HDI growth
were much higher than the world average, and unlike in Angola, the child mortality rates of Zambia
were also rapidly heading in the right direction. 
The  case  studies  of  these  two  countries  are  made  particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of  the
economic development theory combined with Chinese involvement and its relation to the thesis
question. The rapid growth these countries are experiencing is a strong indicator that the Chinese
investments are greatly aiding in their escape from the poverty trap. 
The environmental issue is the issue where the criticisms against Chinese involvement in Africa
have been most valid. The environmental degradation, both locally in host countries and globally as
a result of its domestic industry, by Chinese companies is a serious issue that needs to be addressed.
Climate change is a danger that is especially salient to  sub-Saharan African countries due to both
their geographic location and their economic positions. As Chinese policy on Sudan evolved in part
from international criticism, there are indications that Beijing might increase its focus on taking
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action  on  the  environment.  As  its  own population  is  feeling  the  negative  effects  of  pollution,
protection of the environment, both locally and globally, has been held up as one of the key issues
in the 12th and current five year plan of the Chinese Communist Party. However, whether or not this
will have practical consequences remains to be seen. 
Thus the conclusion is that to a great extent, the criticisms against China on Chinese involvement in
Africa are unfounded. However, there are still important aspects where the criticism is legitimate. 
5.3 Ending the binary world view.
In the conclusion of her article, Erica Downs urged for an end to the “fuzzy thinking” on Sino-
African energy relations. In a similar vein, it is now also the time to end a binary, black-and-white,
world view where countries such as China either do everything right or everything wrong. 
Chinese involvement in Africa is a complicated matter, despite the tendency to lump all African
countries together, and to regard actors as either good or bad. Chinese companies bring with them
both positive and negative consequences as they flock to Africa. It is clear that when it comes to
operating on the international stage, Chinese companies, and by extension their major share holder
the Chinese government, have much to learn.
However, on the other hand, with regards to actually solving the poverty issues in sub-Saharan
African countries, the West also has much to learn from China. A certain amount of pragmatism is
needed as the regimes of developing countries may not always behave in a desired manner, but
writing off the countries through sanctions and refusals of business serves only to perpetuate the
situation of poverty and economical unsustainability. If the goal truly is to get sub-Saharan African
countries out of the poverty trap, ideological trappings must give way to functional pragmatism, and
an end must come to the binary world view.
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5.4 Further research.
As stated in the conclusion above, the rapid GDP and HDI growth rates of Angola and Zambia is a
strong indicator that heavy foreign investment, in their case mainly from China, is an important
factor in escaping the poverty trap. Establishing significant correlations or causal links between an
increase in Chinese involvement in a country and an increase in GDP and HDI, would thus be an
obvious starting point for further research. 
A further line of enquiry which could yield interesting results would be to conduct field work in
areas particularly affected by Chinese industry. In one of his criticisms of Chinese involvement in
Africa, Blair brought up the Zambian opposition leader running on an anti-China platform who,
while still losing the election, did well in the provinces in which the brunt of the Chinese presence
was felt. Field work in these areas would enable the researcher to map the situation on the ground in
areas  heavily  affected  by  Chinese  investments,  to  accurately  describe  its  impact  on  the
communities.
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